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ABSTRACT
This dissertation looks at three aspects of inequality within labor markets: wage
inequality, intergenerational economic mobility, and inequality in higher education
between sexes.
The first chapter examines the contribution of offshoring to the relative decline
in the wages paid to middle skilled workers. Within a task based model of produc-
tion, I develop a theoretical framework that demonstrates how increased offshoring
is consistent with a decline in domestic employment and a reduction in the wages
paid to workers in middle skilled occupations. I test these predictions empirically
using a proxy measure of offshoring. I find that industries which engage in offshoring
see their domestic employment decline over time and have a wider gap between the
wages of their middle and high skilled workers. Current levels of industry offshoring
are significantly correlated with an industry’s lagged occupational composition. Both
material and service offshoring decrease with the share of manual occupations and
service offshoring increases with the share of routine occupations.
Chapter two estimates the magnitude of the intergenerational elasticity of income
found in the NLSY79, and provides a decomposition of this elasticity into paternal
and maternal effects. Roughly one fourth of intergenerational income transmission
v
can be attributed to maternal earnings, and omitting maternal income biases the
estimate of the effect of paternal income by over 20 percent.
The third chapter analyzes the growing inequality in college graduation rates
between men and women. Evidence from two cohorts in the National Longitudinal
Surveys suggests that although women have performed better in high school than
men for several decades, the impact of high school performance on college success has
increased dramatically since the 1980s. The increasing weight attributed to academic
excellence in high school explains a substantial portion of the female advantage in
college graduation over their male peers.
vi
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1Chapter 1
The Contribution of Offshoring to the
Convexification of the U.S. Wage
Distribution
1.1 Introduction
Although overall wage inequality has been increasing in the U.S. since the 1970s,
starting in the mid-1980s, lower-tail inequality stopped growing and declined slightly
while upper-tail inequality increased at an accelerating pace. I use the term convex-
ification to describe the accelerating wage growth for high earning workers, and the
stagnation and relative decline of the middle class. During this same period, the em-
ployment shares of highly paid professionals and low paid service workers rose while
the employment shares of mid-level manufacturing workers and office workers fell.1
These employment and wage changes suggest a decrease in the relative demand for
middle skilled labor.
At the same time, improvements in communication and transportation technol-
ogy contributed to offshoring in both manufacturing and service. The ability to hire
cheap foreign workers should decrease the relative demand for the domestic workers
of similar abilities. Recent work by Goos and Manning (2007), and Autor and Dorn
(2012), offers a “routinization hypothesis:” mid-level jobs are highly routine, and
therefore have the highest degree of substitutability with foreign labor. While some
1See Autor and Acemoglu (2011).
2circumstantial evidence links routine tasks to wage convexification, the wage inequal-
ity literature lacks a direct empirical analysis of the impact of offshoring on relative
wages. Moreover, the existing research focuses on manufacturing even though the
majority of jobs in the American economy are comprised of services.
In this paper I measure the extent to which offshoring by U.S. industries has in-
creased the wage gap between the median wage and the 90th percentile wage but
narrowed the gap between the 10th percentile and the median, thereby contributing
to the observed convexification. First, I present a simple task-based model of labor
supply and wages to illustrate the predicted effects of offshoring on upper and lower
tail wage inequality. I represent offshoring by a drop in the global price for routine
task inputs, and show how this differs from a skill-biased technological change. Sec-
ondly, I construct a measure of offshoring for both material and service inputs, and
apply this measure to 128 industries in both the manufacturing and service sectors
for the years 1990, 2000, and 2011. This approach for offshoring measurement was
initially introduced by Feenstra and Hanson (1996) for material offshoring, and to
my knowledge only Amiti and Wei (2009) have employed this measure for service
offshoring. Rather than focusing solely on either the manufacturing or service sector
in isolation, I include the full economy to provide a comprehensive view of the impact
of offshoring. The analysis also covers a relatively long time frame, using wage and
industry data that span a 21 year period. Thirdly, I employ a fixed effects regression
model to estimate the effect of offshoring on wages and employment and test the im-
plications of the model. I estimate separately the effects on the lower half of the wage
distribution (the 50/10 spread) from the effects on the upper half of the distribution
(the 90/50 spread).
The results of the empirical analysis show that offshoring has a positive effect on
wages throughout the wage distribution. The magnitude of this impact is greatest at
3the top of the distribution; hence there is a statistically significant positive impact
of offshoring on upper tail wage inequality. An increase in service offshoring of one
standard deviation explains about 6% of the observed increase in the upper tail wage
spread, and one standard deviation increase in material offshoring can explain nearly
13% of the observed change. Controlling for industry productivity does not alter
the estimated effect of offshoring on wage levels and spreads. It is plausible that
selection in layoffs is driving this effect: if industries are offshoring jobs previously
done by workers from the bottom half of the wage distribution, the measured wages in
those industries will be higher than they were prior to the introduction of offshoring.
I apply a bounding exercise to provide an upper bound estimate of the effects of
selection on wages, and show that all of the wage effects could be due to selection.
Finally, in order to investigate the impact of routinization, I control for the task
composition of each industry. The estimated offshoring effect does change when
lagged industry occupational shares are included in the regression. This suggests
that the current industry-specific patterns of offshoring are influenced by the past
occupational distributions. The analysis on occupational composition shows that
the lagged task content of each industry is a statistically significant predictor of
both material and service offshoring. In particular, the share of routine occupations
has a positive causal effect on service offshoring. However, this same measure has a
significantly negative causal effect on material offshoring. These results offer empirical
support for the routinization hypothesis when it is applied to service offshoring, but
not with respect to material offshoring.
In Section 2 I provide an overview of U.S. wage convexification, and highlight how
my paper contributes to the literature. Section 3 describes offshoring and discusses
the associated measurement challenges. Section 4 explains the theoretical model that
serves as a framework for the empirical analysis. Section 5 discusses the empirical
4methods. Section 6 examines the results in the context of three mechanisms that
potentially connect offshoring with the wage distribution, and section 7 concludes.
1.2 Wage Convexification Overview
In addition to the increase in overall wage inequality, the change in relative wages
has not been homogenous over the entirety of the distribution. This heterogeneity is
especially pronounced with regards to the last two decades. Figure 1·1 displays the
evolution over time of three points in the male wage distribution: the 10th percentile,
50th percentile, and 90th percentile. We can see that the gap between low-skilled
workers (represented by the 10th percentile position) and median wage earners in-
creased from the mid 1970s until the mid-1980s, but for later periods this 50/10 gap is
either constant or decreasing. In contrast, the gap between the 90th percentile wage
earner and the median wage earner continued to increase throughout the entire time
span of the graph. In particular, the 90/50 gap shows a large expansion from the late
1990s to 2010, indicating a sharp rise in the high-skill premium. The same data for
female wages (Figure 1·2) shows a wage distribution that is slightly less polarized,
but still reflects a greater spread increase in upper half of the distribution than the
lower half.
What is driving this wage convexification? In very broad terms, the research on
wage inequality points to changes in institutional factors, and skill biased technical
change (SBTC). Institutional factors such as unionization and declining real mini-
mum wage are credited in driving lower tail inequality (see Lee (1999), Card and
Dinardo (2002), Lemieux (2006)). However, by 1990, the real minimum wage had
fallen sufficiently that minimum wage laws were no longer binding above the 10th
percentile wage level.2 A growing body of work in the early 2000s focused on SBTC
2See Autor, Manning and Smith (2010).
5as the source of upper tail inequality (including Katz and Autor (1999), Katz and
Acemoglu (2002)). This branch of research argues that an increased use of computers
among college educated workers meant that the productivity of these workers out-
paced non-college educated labor. The relative demand for skilled labor grew quickly
enough to outpace the concurrent rise in relative supplies and the college wage pre-
mium ballooned.
But, increasing returns to education is only part of the story of the upper tail
wage spread, since residual (within group) inequality tracks a similar pattern to the
divergence we see in Figure 1.1 (see Card and Dinardo (2002), Bogliacino (2008 wp)).
Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) and Autor and Acemoglu (2011) point out that
the canonical model used in the SBTC thesis is insufficient for explaining the type
of convexification observed in the U.S. distribution. The key shortcoming in the
canonical SBTC model is that it does not distinguish between skills (college versus
high school education) and tasks (occupational characteristics that are not perfectly
mapped to educational background).
As an alternative framework, Autor et al. (2011, 2012) lay out the “routinization”
hypothesis as follows: workers in the middle of the wage distribution are primarily in
occupations with a high level of routine tasks (for example: record keeping, routine
customer service jobs, repetitive assembly, or sorting goods in a warehouse). These
occupations are characterized by the fact that they can be fully described in a com-
puter algorithm or in a list of instructions to a foreign worker. As a result, they are
highly prone to substitution by technology or offshore labor.3 Along a similar vein,
Autor Katz and Kearney (2006, 2008) propose a model of computerization to explain
the divergence in lower tail and upper tail inequality: computerization complements
complex cognitive tasks, replaces routine tasks, and has little impact on nonroutine
3Blinder (2007) estimates that over 20 million domestic jobs are potentially offshorable due to
their task characteristics.
6manual tasks.
The critical contribution of the task based framework is that it distinguishes be-
tween the demand for middle and low level tasks rather than lumping them together
under the label of “low skilled labor”. In contrast to the mid-level occupations, many
low skill manual occupations are actually non-routine. That is, since the nature of
such tasks demands human interaction these workers are not as easily replaced by
computers or remote labor. These occupations are primarily of the low skilled service
variety: for example, jobs in maintenance, janitorial work, sanitation , childcare, and
hair and nail salons. On the other end of the complexity spectrum, highly analytic
occupations require complicated decision making beyond the scope of what can be
contained in a computer algorithm. These jobs are concentrated at the top of the
wage distribution. The task based model offers a plausible explanation for why work-
ers near the median are in decline relative to both the top and the bottom earners.
Figure 1.3 depicts the 1990-2000 and 2000-2010 changes in employment share by
occupational complexity.4 The data show a striking distinction between these two
periods. During the 1990s, occupation employment share expansion was roughly
monotonic in complexity. The least complex occupations declined while the most
complex occupations gained employment share, and the relative employment in oc-
cupations near the middle of the ranking changed the least. However, in the latter
period the occupations in the middle of the distribution actually lost employment
shares, while both the least and most complex occupations increased their shares.
Since the complexity rankings are highly correlated to wage rankings, similar pat-
terns are observed when we use the occupation’s mean 1990 wage percentile on the
horizontal axis.
Figure 1.4 ranks occupations by their offshorability, and shows the relative change
4Occupation complexity measures the degree to which the occupation is classified as “Nonroutine
Cognitive Analytic.” The raw data is from the O*NET dataset, and the measure is constructed
following Autor Katz and Kearney (2006).
7in employment by percentile. The offshorability measure follows the methodology
used by Autor and Acemoglu in the Handbook of Labor Economics (2011). It ag-
gregates (normalized) O*NET measures regarding two task characteristics: each oc-
cupation’s intensity of routine tasks, and the intensity of face to face interactions.5
According to the routinization hypothesis, routine task intensity causes an occupation
to be more easily offshored while the amount of face to face interactions limits off-
shorability. Consequently, the offshorability measure is defined as (routine intensity)
+(−1)∗(face to face intensity) and normalized in the typical fashion. Unlike the con-
vex effect of the complexity measure, the change in relative employment is strongly
and monotonically negative in offshorability for both decades. Occupations that re-
quire face to face contact from workers appear to be protected from employment loss,
whereas occupations that engage heavily in routine tasks are highly susceptible to
declining employment.
In these figures we see that the data offer strong circumstantial evidence that the
decline in mid-level employment and wages is linked to task characteristics. Whether
an occupation is concentrated in routine or abstract tasks is clearly important in
explaining changes in relative demand. However, the existing literature lacks direct
empirical tests of this link, particularly with respect to offshoring (with the exception
of a new working paper by Oldenski).6 It is also important to point out that either
type of middle task substitution, computerization or offshoring, is consistent with
the routinization hypothesis.7 Either mechanism, or a combination of the two, would
5The measure for routine task intensity comes from the extent to which workers carry out
physical assemply or equipment inspections, calibrations, and repairs based on established checklists
or guidelines. “Face to face interaction” refers specifically to transactions that require physical
proximity of the worker, for example: caring for patients in a hospital, or serving food to a restaurant
patron.
6Recent work by Oldenski (October 2012) supports the claim that offshoring can be explained
by routinization in the years 2002 to 2008.
7Feenstra and Hanson (1999) remains one of the primary studies that aims to directly compare
the two.
8result in a decrease in the relative demand for workers in the mid-level occupations,
and produce a decline in the relative wage of median workers. Given this theoretical
ambiguity, the relative importance of offshoring to expanding wage inequality is an
empirical question that needs to be addressed.
The objective of this paper is to address this gap in the empirical literature.
Specifically, this paper asks the following questions:
1. How much of the observed increase in upper tail inequality can be explained by
offshoring?
2. Are these effects due to selection?
3. How well does the task based model apply to the contribution of offshoring:
does offshoring act as a substitute for routine tasks, and/or does offshoring
increase the relative returns to nonroutine cognitive tasks?
1.3 Offshoring
Public opinion polls show that a majority of Americans believe that increased global-
ization, in the forms of immigration, trade, and offshoring, is harmful to the wages and
employment prospects of native workers.8 Whereas in the past it was primarily manu-
facturing workers who held the view that offshoring was depressing American jobs and
diminishing American wages, workers in the service sector are increasingly adopting
this aversion to offshoring. In a 2004 Gallup poll, two-thirds of investors reported that
they believed offshoring was harmful to the US economy’s overall strength.9 There is
some recent research supporting the point of view that American workers are harmed
by trade and offshoring. Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2012) show that exposure to
8http://www.people-press.org/2011/02/24/public-favors-tougher-border-controls-
and-path-to-citizenship/;
http://www.gallup.com/poll/115240/Americans-Negative-Positive-Foreign-Trade.aspx
9http://www.gallup.com/poll/11506/Investors-Support-Outsourcing.aspx
9Chinese imports has negative effects on local labor market employment and wages.
However, most academic studies on offshoring highlight the labor market benefits. Ot-
taviano, Peri and Wright (2010) conclude that offshoring has no negative effects on
Employment. Using a different measurement technique, Wright (2011) finds that off-
shoring (in the US manufacturing sector 1997-2007) did displace domestic production
workers, but because offshoring industries have greater output, overall employment
in these industries increases. Like Wright, Olney (2011) considers offshoring in the
framework of traded tasks (from Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008)). Comparing
the wage effects of immigration and offshoring, he finds stronger (positive) effects for
wages from offshoring, which he cites as evidence of a productivity effect. Amiti and
Wei (2009) also stress the productivity effect: they credit service offshoring with 10
percent of the increase in labor productivity between 1992 and 2000.
Although these studies provide valuable insights to the aggregate effects of off-
shoring, these effects may not be felt equally throughout the wage distribution. It is
essential to also investigate whether offshoring changes the shape of the wage distri-
bution. Crino´ (2010), shows that medium and low-skilled occupations see a negative
employment response to service offshoring. Although Crino looks exclusively at ser-
vice industries, my analysis of both services and manufacturing confirms his results.
Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999) conduct the most rigorous studies on the effects of
offshoring for the wage distribution in the US 10, and show that offshoring is an impor-
tant channel through which trade affects the demand for labor of different skill types.
They find that that the increase in imported intermediates explains 11% to 51% of
high-skilled labor’s increased share of the total wage bill (the estimate varies based
on the definition of offshoring that is used). However, other studies (e.g. Slaughter
(2001)) find that the impact of offshoring on wage bill share is insignificant when time
10their definition of inequality is the production workers’ share of the total wage bill
10
fixed effects are included.11
1.3.1 What is Offshoring?
Offshoring, also referred to as “trade in tasks,” is defined as conducting some portion
of final good production outside the domestic border. Offshoring is commonly but
incorrectly called “outsourcing,” which refers to arms length production that takes
place either domestically or internationally. It includes both foreign outsourcing from
unrelated suppliers of intermediate goods (international arms length production) and
tasks performed abroad by subsidiaries or related entities of a multinational firm
(foreign direct investment). Tempest (2006) describes Mattel’s production process
for the many components of a Barbie doll, which takes place in the United States,
Saudi Arabia, Japan, Taiwan, China, Indonesia and Malaysia, and finally is marketed
and distributed back in the U.S. Automobiles and electronics are other examples of
goods in which most of the manufacturing process occurs globally.
When offshoring takes the form of intermediate good production, physical goods
are shipped from one country to another and counted as part of total trade volume.
However, a growing portion of trade in tasks is actually in services. Accounting and
tax services, radiology and other medical laboratory processes, customer service call
centers, document processing, and data processing are all services that are now traded
internationally. Given that much of these service products can be delivered between
parties electronically, the transportation costs are close to zero.
The primary obstacle to measuring and studying offshoring in U.S. firms is that
there is no official dataset or reporting process for trade in tasks. When trade in
physical goods occurs between two unaffiliated firms, it is not always clear whether
goods are intermediate inputs or final use commodities. The value of international
transactions within a firm may be manipulated by the firm in order to avoid certain
11I use both time and industry fixed effects throughout my empirical analysis.
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import taxes. Even without firm manipulation, the cost of importing both goods and
services within the firm is much lower than importing them from an unaffiliated sup-
plier. Finally, the fact that offshoring is widely prevalent speaks to another source of
distortion: prices of international commodities are not fully arbitraged, and imported
inputs are generally cheaper than domestic substitutes. Much of the trade in services
is not reported officially at all, although the BEA does now collect survey data from
American firms on trade in services with affiliated parties. For these reasons, it is
neccessary to construct an approximate measure of offshoring.
1.3.2 Offshoring measurement
Offshoring measurement for U.S. industries is not straightforward because the U.S.
does not currently compile data on offshoring by American firms. Feenstra and
Hansen (1996) introduced a method for measuring offshoring in the manufacturing
sector, and Amiti and Wei (2009) follow a similar technique to measure offshoring
in five broad service categories. I build on these previous measures of offshoring by
including both manufacturing and service industries in the analysis, using industry
level input-output tables and trade data for both sectors. I define offshoring as the
share of an industry’s non-energy inputs that are imported. Measurement according
to this definition requires both information about the use of intermediate inputs and
information about import intensities of all relevant inputs. I use a combination of
international trade data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and industry
level production data obtained from BLS input-output tables. The measure of each
industry’s material offshoring of material production is denoted as OSMit and OSSit
is the measured offshoring of service inputs. The intermediate goods usage data is
taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) input output accounts, based
on the 2002 benchmark tables and downloaded from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
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(BLS) 12. These tables give the breakdown of all input materials and services, by
industry. The offshoring measure is defined as:
OSit =
∑
j
[
inputsjit
total non-energy inputsit
]
∗
[
importsjt
productionj + importsj − exportsjt
]
For each input good or service j, the first term represents input purchases of that
good (service) by the industry i during period t, as a fraction of all non-energy inputs
(both material and service) for industry i at time t. The second term represents the
share of good or service j that was imported nationally: total imports of good or
service j, divided by total supply of j (total supply is equal to domestic production
plus net imports of service. This second term is calculated at the country level for
each year, since imports and exports of each input are not available by industry. It
is neccessary to assume a constant share of imports in j for all industries that use j
as an input. The metric can equivalently be expressed as:
OSit =
1
Inputsit
[∑
j
inputsjit ∗ importsjt
total domestic supplyjt
]
Throughout this paper I will use OSM to refer to manufacturing offshoring, and
OSS to refer to service offshoring. The services that I included were (1) finance, (2)
insurance, (3) telecommunications, (4) business support services,13 and (5) computer
and information services. Other major service categories (for example: educational
services, transportation services) are not included because trade volumes are either
equal to zero or simply unreported. The measure for OSM is a sum over 38 manufac-
12The data are available starting in 1993, http://www.bls.gov/emp/ep\_data\_input\
_output\_matrix.htm.
13This includes business, professional, scientific and technical services. For example: legal, ad-
ministrative, medical support services.
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turing industry inputs. Out of the 170 final use commodities in the BEA input-output
tables, I am able to construct measures of OSM and OSS for 129 industries present in
the Census in 1990, 2000 and 2010. Figure 1·5 and Figure 1·6 display the box plots
of these measures over the period 1993 to 2000.14
From the figures, one can see that both measures are increasing over time, and
increasing in variance. This is particularly true of the OSS measure. The data for
trade in services is limited during the 1990s, and it was neccessary to aggregate many
service inputs into the five categories described above. This and the fact that service
imports were very low in the 1990s produce an OSS measure that is quite small in
magnitude and variance during the 1990s. In the 2010 data, the top three industries
in material offshoring were metals processing, computer equipment manufacturing,
and seafood production and packaging. Other industries with a high OSM measures
tended to be manufacturing industries. The top three service offshoring industries
included a service industry: insurance, as well as two manufacturing industries: com-
puter equipment and pharmaceuticals.
1.4 Theoretical Framework
In order to inform the empirical analysis, I describe a simple task based model and
characterize the effect of offshoring on wages within this framework.
1.4.1 Production
The factors of production are labor in the form of three types of tasks: manual (M),
routine (R), or abstract (A). Total economic output is a Cobb-Douglas aggregation
of the three task inputs: Y = LαML
β
RL
γ
A, with α + β + γ = 1. One can think of
14I matched 1993 OSS and OSM measures with wage data from the 1990 Census, since the BEA
data is unavailable for the year 1990.
The measure was adapted to the state level for a robustness check. In order to measure offshoring
variables for a state, I calculated the weighted average of all industry level offshoring measurements,
using each industry’s share of gross state product for the weights.
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the task-specific production LM , LR, and LA as intermediate good production, where
overall economic output is an aggregate of these intermediate goods. Normalizing the
price of the final good to 1 and assuming zero fixed costs, profit is equal to
LαML
β
RL
γ
A − pMLM − pRLR − pALA
where pk is the price of intermediate good k ∈ {M,R,A}. Profit maximization yields
the following first order conditions:
FOC(LM) : α
Y
LM
= pM (1.1)
FOC(LR) : β
Y
LR
= pR (1.2)
FOC(LA) : γ
Y
LA
= pA (1.3)
Dividing (1.3) by (1.2) and rearranging, we can write the relative demand for abstract
tasks with respect to the demand for routine tasks, which is always increasing in pR
pA
.
LA
LR
=
γpR
βpA
(1.4)
Similarly, the relative demand for routine tasks versus manual tasks is increasing in
pM
pR
and can be written as:
LR
LM
=
βpM
αpR
(1.5)
1.4.2 Workers
Labor is supplied inelastically by workers in one of the three types of task (M, R,
or A). Each worker has exogeneously determined skill level z, where z ∼ G(.) over
the interval [0, 1]. An individual with skill level z can produce φk(z) units of output,
where k ∈ {M,R,A}. In this case, worker productivity is constant for task M, but
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linear and increasing in skill for tasks R and A.
φk(z) =

aM , for k = M
aR + bRz, for k = R
aA + bAz, for k = A
Let aM > aR > aA. This means that an individual with the lowest amount of skill,
z = 0, would be the most productive in the M task, and very poor at producing the
A task. Setting 0 < bR < bA means that productivity increases with skill in both
the routine and the abstract tasks, but the marginal return to skill is greater in the
abstract task. These assumptions on the parameters of φk(.) imply that for three
workers with skill levels z′ < z′′ < z′′′, z′ will have a comparative advantage in the
manual task, z′′ will have a comparative advantage in the routine task, and z′′′ will
have a comparative advantage in the abstract task.15 Hence, in an efficient allocation
of labor, the least skilled workers will perform manual tasks, the most skilled workers
will perform abstract, and those workers in the middle of the skill distribution will
perform the routine tasks.
Figure 1.7 illustrates that this is the equilibrium allocation of skill to tasks: for
every skill level z, the worker selects the task in which she earns the highest wage.
Each worker will be paid the value of her marginal product: the unit price for task k
multiplied by her productivity φk(z).
wk(z) = pkφk(z)
We can solve for the threshold points Z1 and Z2 in terms of the productivity param-
eters and intermediate good prices. In equilibrium, the worker with skill level z = Z1
15In general, the assumption that φA(z)φR(z) and
φM (z)
φR(z)
are both increasing in z is sufficient to generate
this pattern of comparative advantage.
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will be indifferent to working in either manual or routine tasks:
pMaM = pR (aR + bRZ1) (1.6)
=⇒ Z1 = pMaM − pRaR
pRbR
(1.7)
Taking the partial derivative of Z1 with respect to pr, we can see that
∂Z1
∂pR
< 0.
∂Z1
∂pR
=
∂
∂pR
(
pMaM − pRaR
pRbR
)
=
−aR(pRbR)− bR(pMaM − pRaR)
(pRbR)2
= −pMbRaM
(pRbR)2
< 0
As the price for the routine task falls, the threshold skill level between the manual
and routine tasks rises. As a result, some workers will switch from the routine to
the manual task. Similarly, the worker with skill level z = Z2 will be indifferent to
working in either routine or abstract tasks:
pR (aR + bRZ2) = pA (aA + bAZ2) (1.8)
=⇒ Z2 = pRaR − pAaA
pAbA − pRbR (1.9)
The threshold level Z2 is increasing in pR:
∂Z2
∂pr
=
∂
∂pr
(
pRaR − pAaA
pAbA − pRbR
)
=
aR(pAbA − pRbR)− (pRaR − pAaA)(−bR)
(pAbA − pRbR)2
=
aRpAbA − bRpAaA
(pAbA − pRbR)2
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which is > 0 if and only if
aRpAbA > bRpAaA
aR
bR
>
aA
bA
The above inequality holds by assumption (aR > aA and bR < bA). As the global
price for the routine task increases, the threshold skill level between the routine and
abstract tasks rises: some workers previously performing the routine task will switch
to the abstract task. Substituting the parameters for Z1 and Z2, we can express the
length of the skill interval in which routine tasks are performed as
Z2 − Z1 = (pMaM − pAaA) pRbR + (pRaR − pMaM) pAbA
(pAbA − pRbR) pRbR (1.10)
This expression is increasing in PR: the skill interval that represents the workers
engaged in the routine task will narrow as the price for routine labor falls.
1.4.3 Labor Market Clearing
Market clearing in each type of task requires that the sum of the workers’ productivity
in each type of task must be equal to the total factor demand. The market clearing
condition for manual tasks LM is:
LM = aRG(Z1) (1.11)
SinceG′(.) is non-negative, the share of domestic labor in the manual task will increase
as Z1 increases (equivalently, as pR decreases).
Market clearing for routine and abstract tasks are given by:
LR = aR (G(Z2)−G(Z1)) + bR
Z2∫
Z1
z.g(z) dz (1.12)
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and
LA = aA (G(1)−G(Z2)) + bA
1∫
Z2
z.g(z) dz (1.13)
We can show that LR, the mass of domestic labor production in the routine task,
is generally increasing in pR.
∂LR
∂pR
= aR
[
G′(Z2)
∂Z2
∂pR
−G′(Z1)∂Z1
∂pR
]
+ bR
 ∂
∂pR
Z2(pR)∫
Z1(pR)
zg(z)dz
 (1.14)
The first term in (1.14) is positive:
aR
[
G′(Z2)
∂Z2
∂pR
−G′(Z1)∂Z1
∂pR
]
> 0
because
G′(z) > 0
∂Z2
∂pR
> 0
∂Z1
∂pR
< 0.
The second term is also positive. We can write this term as:
bR
 ∂
∂pR
Z2(pR)∫
Z1(pR)
zg(z)dz
 = bR
∂Z2
∂pR
Z2g(Z2)− ∂Z1
∂pR
Z1g(Z1) +
Z2∫
Z1
∂
∂pR
(zg(z)) dz
 .
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Since
∂Z2
∂pR
> 0
∂Z1
∂pR
< 0
Z2g(Z2) > 0
Z1g(Z1) > 0
∂
∂pR
(zg(z)) = 0,
it follows that
bR
 ∂
∂pR
Z2(pR)∫
Z1(pR)
zg(z)dz
 > 0
=⇒ ∂LR
∂pR
> 0.
Similarly, we can show that
∂LA
∂pR
=
∂
∂pR
aA (G(1)−G(Z2)) + bA 1∫
Z2
z.g(z) dz
 < 0. (1.15)
1.4.4 Offshoring in the task based framework
Offshoring occurs when firms can use foreign workers to replace more costly domestic
workers. As Autor (2008) points out, certain characteristics make a specific class of
occupations easier for a firm to offshore. For example, occupations requiring face
to face contact (such as childcare providers, bartenders, public transportation atten-
dants) may not require a high level of skill, but are difficult or impossible to offshore.
Abstract tasks are also prohibitively difficult or costly to offshore, because these
occupations require the worker to engage in a constantly changing enviroment and
respond using human judgement. Assuming that routine (R) tasks are the potentially
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offshorable task input, access to cheap foreign labor for this task is equivalent to a
decrease in the global price for R tasks: pR ↓. As a result, some of the domestic
middle task workers will be displaced by foreign workers, and switch to either the
manual or the abstract task. From Equation (1.10) one can show that with a decline
in pR, (Z2 − Z1) will decrease. Using Equation(1.12), this also means that the quan-
tity of domestic labor employed in the routine task will fall. Furthermore, congruent
with the Stolper Samuelson theorem, the relative payments to abstract task workers
relative to routine workers will increase, since routine tasks are now being imported.
Figure 1.8 shows the effect of this type of price shock on wages and on the allocation
of workers between tasks.
In this framework, introduction of offshoring as a decline in the global price of
mid-level labor implies that increased offshoring will be associated with decreased real
wages for middle skilled workers, an increased 90/50 spread, as well as a decreased
50/10 spread. One could also consider the case in which routine and abstract tasks
are price complements 16: in this case a decline in the global price for routine tasks
will increase the demand for abstract tasks, and we will see an increased wage level
for high skill workers as in Figure 1.9.
1.5 Empirical Strategy
1.5.1 Measuring Inequality
The empirical analysis uses data from several sources. For individual level wages, I
use data from the 1990 and 2000 Census, and the 2011 American Community Survey
(ACS).17 I restrict the sample to civilian individuals aged 16 to 65 who worked for
16for example, a CES production function with elasticity of substitution¡1
17Earnings from the 2011 ACS are further removed from the 2008 recession shock than earnings
in the 2010 ACS.
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wages for at least one week in the year prior to the survey. Using annual earnings,
weeks worked during the year, and average hours per week, I construct hourly wages
for each individual. For each industry in 1990, 2000, and 2011, I use the difference in
log wages between the 10 percentile and the median, as well as the log gap between
the median and 90th percentile wage, as measures of lower and upper tail inequality,
respectively. Table 1.1 describes the data aggregated at the industry-year level.18 The
mean industry employs a little under 1 million people. It pays an annual income to
its 10th percentile, median, and 90th percentile workers of roughly $7,000, $28,000,
and $63,000.19 Employees of the average industry are 15 percent foreign born, 11
percent black, 37 percent female, 22 percent college educated, and 17 percent are
union members. The final dataset used in the empirical analysis has 367 observations:
121 industries in 1990, and 123 in 2000 and 2011.
1.5.2 Econometric specification
I used a fixed effects model for the baseline analysis. The empirical framework for
examining the effect of offshoring on inequality is the following:
Yit = α + β1ossit + β2osmit + γXit + δi + τt + eit
where Yit is the relevant outcome variable for industry i during year t, osmit is off-
shoring of material inputs, ossit is service offshoring, Xit includes industry charac-
teristics: controls for female, black, and immigrant employment, college-educated
share of employment, and unionization. (Observations are weighted by total industry
employment, measured in persons employed.)20
18Industries are defined at the 3-digit NAICS level, although it is neccesary to further combine
some of the 3-digit industries in order to harmonize data from the Census and the BEA.
19All dollar amounts are given in 1999 dollars.
20In a perfectly competitive model of the labor market, workers of equal skill levels should have
identical wages across industries. However, there is plenty of empirical evidence of inter-industry fric-
tions and resulting wage differentials; see Gibbons and Katz (1992), Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis
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The dependent variables that I use include: log hourly wage at the 10th, 50th,
and 90th percentiles, and the spreads between the median log wage and the 10th and
90th percentile log wages, respectively.
spread50−10,i,t = lnω
50
it − lnω10it
spread90−50,i,t = lnω
90
it − lnω50it
These measures represent the mid-skill premium relative to low-skill wages, and the
high-skill premium relative to mid-level wages.
1.6 Results
The results for the baseline fixed effects model are displayed in Table 1.2. Columns
1, 2, and 3 use the log wage at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles as the dependent
variable. The outcome variable in Column 4 is the lower tail inequality: the difference
between the 10th percentile and 50th percentile log wage. Column 5 uses the upper
tail inequality: the difference between the median and the 90th percentile. I also
include log industry employment as a dependent variable; these results are in Column
6. All specifications include a full set of year and industry fixed effects. With the
exception of Column 6, observations are weighted by industry employment.
Both OSS and OSM have a significant and positive effect on wages throughout
the wage distribution. Because the magnitude of these effects is substantially larger
for the industries’ 90th percentile wage than for the median wage, OSM and OSS
also each have a significant and positive effect on the upper tail wage spread, with
estimated coefficients of βˆOSS = 1.376
∗∗ and βˆOSM = 0.215∗∗ (see Column 5 of Table
1.2).21
(1999).
21Robustness checks: these results are robust to various alternative specifications. I separate the
sample by gender, and also into services and manufacturing. I use weekly log wages to construct
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Table 1.3 interprets the results of the fixed effect regression in the context of the
sample data set. During the sample period 1990-2011, industry upper tail inequality
(ln(w90
w50
) has a standard deviation of 0.1735 log points. An estimated OSS coefficient
of 1.376 for the upper tail regression means that an increase in the OSS measure
of 1 standard deviation is associated with an increase in upper tail wage inequality
of approximately 0.011 log points, or roughly 6% of the between industry standard
deviation found in the data. An OSM coefficient of 0.215 implies that a 1 standard
deviation increase in material offshoring results in an increased upper tail spread of
0.02 log points, which is 12.6% of the observed industry variance.
The time series interpretation is summarized in Table 1.4. Between 1990 to 2011,
the mean industry in the sample experienced an increase in services offshoring from
0.0143 to 0.0287, a difference of 0.0144. This implies an increase in upper tail wage
inequality of (1.376)(0.0144) = 0.02 log points, which is 32% of the observed increase
in the 90/50 spread for this period.22 Similarly, the increase in material offshoring
of 0.114 23 implies an increase in the 90/50 spread of 0.025 log points: 40% of the
observed rise in upper tail inequality.
In contrast to the positive wage effects, material offshoring has a negative effect
on employment: Column 6 of Table 1.2 shows that the estimated coefficent for OSM
is -1.236**, indicating that a 10% increase in material offshoring leads to a 12%
decline in industry employment. (Due to the limited variation of the trade services
data, these results are not precise enough to give any information about the effect of
the wage levels and spreads, and I remove various industry level controls (not the fixed effects). I
use different definitions for the wage spreads (for example: 30th-10th percentile spread, or 90th-
70th percentile spread), and do not find any discontinuities. I also use the CPS wage data as an
alternative to the Census. In general these regressions have less precision, but do not contradict the
results in the baseline equation.
22from Table 1.1: mean increase in 90/50 spread from 1990 to 2011 was 0.062 log points
23The mean industry OSM measure was 0.112 in 1990, and 0.226 in 2011.
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service offshoring on employment.) Given the sample standard deviation in OSM of
0.102, this result attributes 9.5% of the standard deviation in employment to material
offshoring. These data clearly indicate a tradeoff between employment and real wage
levels for workers in offshoring industries.
1.6.1 Potential Mechanisms
There are three primary reasons that offshoring might have a positive effect on wages
and the upper tail spread. The first standard explanation of many trade models is
that offshoring is associated with more productive industries, and workers in such
industries are rewarded for their relatively high marginal product with higher wages.
If these wage effects are increasing in the wage rank, they would act to exacerbate
the upper tail spread as well. It is important to note that this mechanism is not
consistent with a competive labor market model: in a competitive model, wages are
determined on a macro level by labor supply and demand and firms choose a level of
production at which the marginal product of labor is equal to the market wage. 24
However, several other authors including Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008),
Ottaviano et al. (2010), and Wright (2011) assume a model in which offshoring de-
creases production costs and increases productivity in all workers. In order to address
this viewpoint, I include industry level productivity as a control in the fixed effects
regression. (Productivity is defined as output per labor hour.) In Table 1.5, I include
industry productivity, and find that the coefficients for wage levels and spreads are
24Example: CD Production (Y = LαK1−α)
• Profit maximization →
αLα−1K1−α = ω
productivity =
LαK1−α
L
= α−1ω
• Productivity ↑ because ω ↑
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very similar to those in the baseline fixed effects model. In addition, the productivity
coefficients in the wage level and wage spread regresions are insignificant. From these
results there is no evidence that the wage effects in Table 1.2 are driven by increased
productivity. Regressing productivity on industry controls and the offshoring mea-
sures also fails to indicate that either form of offshoring has any significant effect on
productivity.
Secondly, the positive wage effects could be driven by the fact that industries
that offshore heavily are disproportionately replacing their low and middle skilled
domestic workers with foreign workers. This explanation is supported by the large
negative effect of OSM on employment, shown in Column 6 of Table 1.2. 25 In the
extreme case, if the total unemployment implied by the additional offshoring came
from the bottom half of the distribution, this would result in higher average wages
for the new distribution of surviving workers. By construction, 10th percentile wages
in an industry that has previously laid off the low skilled workers will be higher than
the 10th percentile wage in an identical industry that did not undergo such layoffs.
I carry out the following bounding exercise in order to assess the extent to which
the employment effects could create the illusion of higher wages throughout the wage
distribution. First, for each industry in the 1990 sample, I multiply the observed
change in OSM between 1990 and 2000 by the value of the OSM coefficient in the
fixed effects model of log employment (approximately 1.2, Table 1.2, column 6).
βOSM ∗ 4OSMi,1990−2000 ∗ 100%
This gives the predicted percentage decrease in employment implied by the regression
results in column (6) of Table 1.2. Then, I look at the case in which the full change
in employment comes from the lower end of the wage distribution. For example,
25This negative effect of offshoring on employment contradicts the findings of Olney (2011)
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suppose an industry increased OSM by 0.08 (dOSMi,1990−2000 ∗ 100 = 8%). The
implied percentage decrease in industry i as a result of material offshoring is equal to
1.2 ∗ dOSMi,1990−2000 ∗ 100% =
1.2 ∗ 8% = 10%
where dOSMi,1990−2000 is the change in the OSM measure between 1990 and 2000.
All workers in the 1990 sample are ranked according to their hourly wages, and the
lowest 10 percent of workers are eliminated. I use a similar method to truncate all
industries in the 2000 sample, using the change in OSM between 2000 and 2010. The
2010 sample is unchanged for this exercise.
Table 1.6 shows the results from the bounded dataset. The coefficient for OSS
is not much changed for any of the outcomes. This is in line with reasonable ex-
pectations since the datsets were not truncated on the basis of changes in the OSS.
It also supports the weak correlation between OSS and OSM. However, the effects
of OSM on the low level and median wage are now significantly negative, and the
effect on the high level wage is statistically zero. Both the lower tail spread (column
4) and upper tail spread (column 5) regressions show a postive coefficient for OSM.
The coefficient in column 5, for the upper tail spread, has increased from 0.215*** to
0.473***. So, it is possible that the negative employment effects are not only giving
the offshoring industries the appearance of higher wages, but also masking the full
impact on upper tail inequality. It is important to emphasize that since I cannot
track which individuals are laid off between Censuses, this bounding exercise shows
only what the employment effect may be doing, and it cannot provide any definitive
empirical support for this mechanism. It shows only that this mechanism cannot be
ruled out.
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Thirdly, in keeping with the task based framework, it could be that offshoring
acts as a substitute for the routine task inputs originally performed by workers in
the middle of the wage distribution. When industries experience increased access
to offshoring, the global price of routine task inputs drop. As a result, domestic
workers see their market wage fall relative to workers in manual and abstract tasks,
as depicted in Figure 1·8. This mechanism alone would explain a positive effect of
offshoring on the upper tail spread, but it would not directly imply higher real wages
throughout the skill distribution. Furthermore, if only routine tasks and not low skill
manual tasks are offshored, we would see a negative effect of offshoring on the 50/10
spread.
Some authors (for example, Acemoglu et al. (2011)) have proposed that offshoring
operates like an abstract task enhancing technological shock (see Figure 1·9). For
example, if offshoring is complementary to the highly complex task, and substituble
with routine occupations, increased offshoring would produce an increased wage gap
between these two categories and explain the positive wage effects seen at the 90th
percentile level. The observable implications are similar if routine and abstract tasks
are p-complements. Nonetheless, without an overall increase in worker productivity,
this still does not explain the positive wage effects at the 10th and 50th percentiles.
In order to investigate this task based model as a potential explanation, I use data
on task characteristics from the O*NET database.26 The O*NET dataset contains
various measures of task characteristics associated with several hundred different oc-
cupations. I start with a rough partition that classifies all of occupations as being
either routine, manual or abstract, then refine these classifications into six differ-
ent measurements. Following the practice of Autor Levy Murnane (2003), Autor
and Dorn (2012 wp) and Autor Katz and Kearney (2006), the refined measures are
26The Occupational Informational Network, or O*NET, is a database produced jointly by the
US Deparment of Labor and the Employment and Traning Administration. It is available online at
http://www.onetcenter.org/.
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organized along two broad dimensions: (i) routine versus non-routine, and (ii) cog-
nitive versus manual. Non-routine tasks are further described as either analytic or
interpersonal. Additionally, non-routine occupations could be either physical (truck
drivers, fire fighters) or cognitive (lawyers, teachers) in nature. Table 1.7 gives de-
scriptions and examples for each of the six measures: non-routine cognitive analytic,
non-routine cognitive personal, routine cognitive, routine manual, non-routine manual
physical, non-routine manual personal. Examples of non-routine cognitive analytic
occupations are physicians, mathematicians, and economists. Examples of Routine
Cognitive occupations include switchboard operators and call center workers.
These measures are normalized across the occupations that appear in the 1990
Census, which serves as my base year. I assigned each occupation in my dataset
a binary score for each of these nine measures, equal to 1 if the occupation’s score
was above the mean occupation score in the 1990 sample. For example, in 1990,
the (weighted27) mean routine cognitive score for all ocupations was equal to -.0771.
So, an occupation in any year is classified as Routine Cognitive (RCog=1) if it has
a routine cognitive score greater than -.0771. Then, industries are described by the
fraction of occupations in each of the six main categories. This means that an occu-
pation has a binary variable in each of the three course categories, and each of the six
finer categories, and each industry has nine corresponding continuous variables that
vary between zero and one.
To summarize the relationships between these task measures and offshoring, I
regressed service and material offshoring on the lagged industry level measures. Lag-
ging the occupational composition reduces the potential for endogeneity, assuming
that current offshoring does not affect past industry composition. Table 1.8 shows
the results from regressing OSS on the three coarse categories in Column (1), and
the results from regressing OSM on the three coarse categories in Column (2). It is
27weighted by the occupation’s 1990 population
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clear that there are fundamental differences between the two different forms of off-
shoring. OSS increases with the share of routine jobs and decreases with the share
of manual jobs. This is consistent with the notion that the routine tasks are highly
offshorable, while manual tasks require a proximate worker and are harder to move
overseas. However, Column (2) shows that material offshoring decreases with routine
jobs and increases with the share of abstract tasks.
Since the latter result appears to contradict the assumptions of the task based
model, I re-estimate the two equations using the finer task descriptions. The esti-
mated coefficients for the finer measures are given in Columns (3) and (4) of Table
1.8. With respect to service offshoring, the positive effect of routine tasks in Column
(1) is supported by the positive effect of Routine Cognitive tasks in Column (3). The
negative effect of manual tasks on OSS is also confirmed, since the variables non-
routine manual physical and nonroutine manual personal also have negative signs.
The material offshoring measure is less straightforward. Both types of routine task
measures–cognitive and manual–have negative signs, although only the former effect
is statistically significant. But the coarse abstract measure is divided into Nonroutine
Cognitive Analytical and Personal. While both these measures have a positive effect
on OSM, neither is significant.
Finally, I run the baseline fixed effects regression including all original control
variables in addition to the 10 year lagged fraction of occupations in the industry that
are in each of the three coarse categories, followed by the six finer measures.28 Tables
1.9 and 1.10 show that including these lagged occupation shares does change the
estimated effect of the OSM measure and OSS meausures. For a given occupational
composition, an industry will see larger effect on upper tail inequality from OSS and
a slightly smaller but still positive effect from OSM.
28Using current occupation shares does not change the offshoring coefficients from those seen
in the baseline regression; moreover current offshoring measures appear uncorrelated with current
industry composition
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1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I examine the impact of offshoring on wage convexification through the
framework of a task based model. In particular, I look for evidence to support the
hypothesis that offshoring decreases relative wages of middle skilled workers because
these workers perform highly routine tasks. I use industry level measures of offshoring
and aggregate individual wage data to construct industry measures of upper and lower
tail inequality. I find that offshoring significantly increases wage levels at each point
in the earnings distribution and also increases the 90/50 spread.
Of the three mechanisms that I consider, both a productivity effect and selection
are consistent with the positive wage effects. I show that the positive wage effects
could be fully explained by selection, and this explanation is plausible because the
increased wages in offshoring industries are accompanied by a large decrease in em-
ployment. However there is no empirical evidence of productivity enhancement. In
other words, elevated wages in highly offshored industries are most likely due solely to
the fact that domestic positions for low paid, low skilled workers are being eliminated.
The positive effect of service offshoring on the 90/50 spread is magnified when lagged
occupational composition is controlled for, while the positive effect of material off-
shoring is dampened. This study provides support for the hypothesis that offshoring
is directly increasing inequality in the upper half of the wage distribution, but also
shows that positive wage effects of offshoring are due to selection in layoffs. The
results shown in this paper indicate that offshoring acts as a substitute for domestic
workers in routine service occupations.
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Figure 1·1: Evolution of Hourly Wages (Men)
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Figure 1·2: Evolution of Hourly Wages (Women)
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Figure 1·3: Changes in Employment Shares by Complexity
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Figure 1·4: Changes in Employment Shares by Offshorability
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Figure 1·5: Offshoring of Material Inputs
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Figure 1·6: Offshoring of Service Inputs
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Figure 1·7: Wage Schedule for Efficient Task Allocation
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Figure 1·8: Decline in the Global Price for Routine Tasks
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Figure 1·9: Abstract Task Enhancing Technology
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Table 1.4: Effect on Upper Tail Inequality
S hare of 90/50 Increase Explained by Offshoring (Mean Industry 1990-2011)
∆1990−2011 OS β ∆1990−2011 ∗ β ∆1990−2011 Ineq. ∆Predicted∆Observed
OSS 0.0144 1.376 0.0199 0.062 0.32
OSM 0.1151 0.215 0.0247 0.062 0.40
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Chapter 2
The Role of Gender in Income Mobility
2.1 Introduction
Previous studies of intergenerational income mobility in the United States have fo-
cused primarily on the transmission of earnings from fathers to sons. However, thanks
to the increase in female labor force participation throughout the last several decades,
combined with the new availability of longitudinal, multi-generational data, it is now
possible to include both mothers and daughters in this analysis. This allows re-
searchers to know whether the effect of maternal earnings is separate and distinct
from the effect of the father’s earnings. Furthermore, we can investigate whether the
effect of either parent on the child’s income varies with the gender of the child.
The goal of this paper is to examine the role of gender in income mobility. Specif-
ically, it measures the difference in the degree of income mobility experienced by
daughters versus sons, as well as the relevance of maternal versus paternal earnings
to income mobility. This is an important topic because it can help to illuminate the
mechanism of intergenerational income transmission. A parent’s and child’s lifetime
incomes are correlated for at least three reasons: 1) genetic transmission of earning
ability, 2) direct transmission of income through bequeathment or investment in the
child’s human capital, or 3) through assortative matching in marriage. Assortative
matching in either generation can impact the child’s income. First of all, the parent’s
income is correlated with the genes and wealth of his/her spouse, which will then
be positively correlated with the child’s income. Secondly, the parent’s income can
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improve the marriage market for the child through various channels. For example,
having wealthy parents is likely to give the child access to higher socioeconomic circles
(exposure to higher quality potential matches), and is also likely to result in greater
human capital investment (making the child more attractive to others).
A different magnitude of elasticity with respect to maternal income compared
to paternal income indicates that investment in children’s human capital may be
tied to the allocation of earnings within a household. If this investment is the most
important mechanism for income transmission, we would expect a larger elasticity
with respect to the parent who prefers higher levels of investment. Previous studies
have suggested this parent is the mother; for example, see Currie and Moretti (2003).
Furthermore, if the income of the same-sex parent has a larger impact, this could
reflect the importance of labor force attachment. Daughters who grow up with high
income earning mothers may feel more incentive to pursue higher earning careers
themselves.
Assortative matching in the marriage market and differences in labor supply be-
tween men and women are the main reasons income elasticities may differ for sons
and daughters.1 On average, women are still less likely to work then men. With
assortative matching, women with high earning fathers tend to marry men who also
have high earning fathers. The established high level of income elasticity between fa-
thers and sons means that these women will have high earning husbands. If married
couples have negative cross price labor supply elasticities, these women will be less
likely to participate in the labor force, and more likely to work fewer hours. As a
result, their wages will be lower. Additionally, assortative matching combined with
intergenerational patterns of labor supply will impact the household’s intergenera-
tional income elasticity (IGE). Fernandez, Fogli and Olivetti (2004) find that women
with working mothers in law have higher labor supply than women whose husbands’
1See Raaum et al. (2007)
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mothers did not work. This underscores the benefit of isolating the effects of elasticity
with respect to maternal income.
I use data from the Children of the NLSY97 (NLSY97 C/YA) to estimate income
elasticity with respect to parental earnings. This is a panel dataset, which allows
for some control of the bias due to measurement error in permanent income of both
the parents and their children. Within the NLSY97 C/YA sample, the estimated
elasticity of income with respect to paternal income is around 0.33 for sons, and
0.163 for daughters. The effect of maternal income was not significant for sons, and
0.15 for daughters. However, in pooled regressions of sons and daughters there is no
evidence that the IGE depends on the child’s gender. In addition, non-linear least
squares estimation implies that IGE with respect to maternal income is significant
but roughly one half the magnitude of IGE with respect to paternal earnings.
In Section 2 I briefly describe the existing literature in this research area, concen-
trating primarily on the U.S. studies. Section 3 discusses the features of the NLSY
data. In Section 4, I present the empirical model and estimation results, and Section
5 concludes the paper.
2.2 Previous Studies
The most conspicuous weakness in the empirical research on income mobility is the
exclusion of women. Solon (1999) summarizes major studies that have been done
on income mobility in the United States, and lists 15 papers that focus solely on
the incomes of fathers and sons, and only four that examine the level of mobility for
daughters. Of these four that include the daughter’s income as an outcome variable,
Altonji and Dunn (1991) and Peters (1992) use NLS data, as I did2. On average,
the more recent literature suggests an elasticity for American sons around 0.4, and
2Both papers estimated a higher level of mobility than my results show.
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around 0.3 for American daughters3. None of these studies isolated the influence of
maternal income. More recently, work by Jantti et al. (2006) find that the elasticity
for daughters’ earnings with respect to fathers’ are smaller than the corresponding
elasticity for sons’ earnings. However, they do not separately control for the effect of
maternal earnings.
The elasticity estimates tend to increase in size with the date of publication. This
does not necessarily implicate an increasing elasticity over time. Rather, the empirical
approach to this question has evolved over time to include more refined controls for
omitted variables and measurement error. Most of the empirical studies from the
1970s and 1980s estimated an intergenerational elasticity in the United States around
0.2, for example: Behrman and Taubman (1985); Sewell and Hauser (1975), Becker
and Tomes (1986). However, Chadwick and Solon (2002) show that measurement
error in the wage data results in a downward bias on the elasticity estimates, that
is, an overstatement of income mobility. Chadwick and Solon use the parents’ ages
to instrument for earnings as a method of controlling the measurement error bias.
They examine the relationship between the parents combined earnings, and the total
earnings of their daughter and son in law. Using data from the PSID, they estimate
that intergenerational elasticity of household income is around 0.44.
Chadwick and Solon, along with other studies (Mazumder (2005), for example)
have also addressed the need to control for measurement error in the child’s perma-
nent income5. Mayer and Lopoo (2004, 2005) include only children aged 30 in their
analysis to try to control for this bias. Lee and Solon (2006) address the measure-
ment error by including extensive controls for both the child’s age and birth cohort,
as well as controls for the interaction of the child’s age with the parental income.
3This is an imperfect comparison, since the econometric specifications are not identical across
authors.
4Solon (1992) found a comparable measure when linking the generations via sons.
5I will discuss this issue further in Section 4.
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Mazumder (2005) includes similar age controls, but also addresses the problem of
top-coded income data (the highest values are censored to protect individual privacy)
and incorporates a very long term average for paternal income over a period of 16
years.
Mazumder’s study suggests that even Solon et al. estimates were biased down-
wards: he estimates father-son elasticity to be 0.613, and father-daughter elasticity
slightly lower at 0.57. It should be noted that since earnings shocks are persistent,
even multi-year averages are imperfect measures of permanent income. Mazumder
considers family income to be a better measure of permanent income than paternal
earnings alone when only a few years of earnings data is available for the individual.
Of course, this precludes the possibility of measuring the relative importance of the
father’s earnings versus the mother’s.
I was unable to find a study that included maternal income separately from pa-
ternal income, although several summed the two and used total household income as
an explanatory variable (for example, Chadwick and Solon (2000) and Ermisch et al.
(2006)). However, assortative matching in the marriage market means that should a
mother’s income affect her child’s income mobility, omitting the maternal income will
bias the estimate of child-father elasticity (see Lam and Schoeni (1993) or Behrman
and Rosenzweig (2002)).
2.3 Data
My analysis uses data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79),
and from the NLSY79 Children and Young Adults (NLSY79 C/YA). Each respondent
in the C/YA survey is the biological child of a woman in the original NLSY79. For the
NLSY79 C/YA, children aged 15 and older were interviewed biennially until 2008 (the
latest available data), and the survey includes detailed questions about labor force
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experiences. Since it is possible to link the data for children in the NLSY79 C/YA to
women and their spouses in the NLSY79, these two sources allowed me to construct a
bi-generational dataset with earnings information for the mother (respondent in the
NLSY79), father (respondent’s spouse), and child(ren) (in the NLSY79 C/YA).
I restricted the sample to children at least 25 years old in 2010, who reported
annual income for at least one year between 1994 and 2010, and had mothers in the
NLSY79 who were married exactly once. Only earnings reported after the age of
25 was used to construct the children’s permanent income measures.6 There were
735 children (337 males and 398 females) that met these requirements and also had
parents with reported annual income.
Table 3.1 describes the characteristics of the restricted sample, including the ages
of each of the family members during their recorded earning years. The actual ages
of the children ranged from 25 to 40 in 2010, and the mean annual income after
age 25 was $19,777 for men and $15,490 for women. (All income values are in year
2000 dollars.) The mothers in this sample had an earnings distribution substantially
below the fathers. The income data for both children and parents shown in Table
3.1 is measure of average real income. This measure is described in greater detail in
Section 4.
Tables 2 and 3 give the basic correlation coefficients for income and education of
the parents and children.7 The correlation between the log income of the father and
the log income of the child is 0.22 and the correlation between the father’s and child’s
is 0.28. The correlation for child’s and mother’s income is considerable smaller: 0.14.
6Individuals over the age of 25, despite being far from the peak of their earnings life-cycle, still
have earnings that are much more representative of their lifetime permanent income than measures
of current income from their late teens or very early twenties.
7The income correlation coefficient ρ is related to IGE β by the following expression:
ρ = (σ0/σ1)β
where σ0 is the standard deviation of the initial generation’s income and σ1 is the standard deviation
of the child’s generation’s income.
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However, the schooling correlations are fairly equal for the two parents: 0.28 for the
child-father, and 0.29 for the child mother. There is evidence of assortative matching
in the parent generation: the correlation of husbands’ and wives’ years of schooling
is 0.33, and the correlation between husbands’ and wives’ log permanent income is
around 0.3.
2.4 Econometric Model and Results
Suppose each family unit i has a single decision maker (the parent). This parent’s
permanent income partly determines each child’s income via the parent’s decision to
invest in the child’s human capital8.
Following the statistical model of Solon (1992), the lifetime permanent income of
child j from family i can be decomposed as9
yij = ai + bij
8Simplified from Becker and Tomes (1979). A parent solves the problem:
max(Ui) = αC0 + (1− α)y1
subject to the budget constrainty0 = C0 + I0
whereC0 = parental consumption
I0 = parent’s investment in child’s human capital
y0 = parental income
y1 = child’s income.
The technology translating the investment I0 into the child’s permanent income y1 is:
y1 = (1 + r)I0 + E1
where r is the rate of return on the child’s human capital, and E1 represents all other determinants of
the child’s income. The first order condition for the parent’s problem implies the optimal investment
is:
I0 = αy0 − (1− α)E1
(1 + r)
which implies the following relationship between the parent’s and child’s permanent income:
y1 = βy0 + αE1
where β = α(1− r). The interpretation of β is the intergenerational income elasticity.
9Expressing these variables as deviations from the mean allows us to suppress the intercept term.
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where ai represents the fixed effect for family i, and bij is the idiosyncratic component
for child ij. ai, the family background effect, can be written as a sum of βXi: the effect
of parental income, and zi: the influence of all family background factors orthogonal
to parental income. That is:
ai = βXi + zi
where zi is uncorrelated to ai, and therefore uncorrelated to yij. Hence the expression
for the child’s permanent income becomes
yij = βXi + zi + bij = βXi + uij
(where uij = zi + bij). If this is the correct specification, OLS will yield a consistent
estimator for β. When we use log income, β represents the elasticity of yij with
respect to Xi. However, obviously we cannot perfectly observe permanent income. If
instead of permanent income we use current income yijt = yij +µijt, where µijt is the
idiosyncratic income shock in year t, it is simple to show that
plim(βˆOLS) = β − V ar(µij0)
E(y2ij
< β
To approximate permanent parental income with minimal measurement error, I
used a simple average of reported annual income over the period 1979 to 2008, denoted
as Yi0. For the parent with reported income in a total of T years (not consecutive, in
general), this is defined as
Yi0 =
1
T
{∑
t
Yi0t
}
where Yi0t is the annual income of the parent to child i in year t. I will use yi0 to
denote log(Yi0). Since the current income values used to generate Yi0 for each parent
are not reported at a common level of age and experience, it is neccessary to control
for the ages of the individual at the time of the reported annual income. Following
Lee and Solon, I included controls for a quadratic in parental age Ai. I defined the
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age control as
Ai0 =
1
T
{∑
t
Agei0t
}
for each t used in the Yi0 measure, and where Agei0t is the age of the parent to
individual i in year t. Although Lee and Solon included a full quartic in parental age,
I did not find a marginal benefit of any higher order terms beyond A2i0.
In addition to the measurement error in the parental income, it was also necessary
to control for the measurement error due to observing current rather than permanent
income for the children. While measurement error in the left hand side variable
generally does not affect the consistency of the OLS estimator, this measurement
error is clearly correlated with the observed current income and therefore will bias the
estimate. At the earliest years of the child’s life cycle, current income is smaller than
permanent income. As the child gains experience, the difference between current and
permanent income diminishes. Reville (1995) found that because of this measurement
error, estimates for intergenerational elasticity are much lower when the children’s
income data is collected early in the life cycle10. A lower measured correlation between
the earnings of parents and children implies a higher degree of income mobility. To
control for the fact that a large fraction of my data for the children’s earnins was
measured early in the life cycle, I included a control for a quadratic in the child’s
age for every year. Additionally, the size of the NLS database allowed me to restrict
observations to only those children aged 25 years and older. This provided some
guarantee that the children beyond past the earliest years of their earnings life cycle.
Even after this age restriction, the sample retained over 4,000 individuals. I also
included an interaction terms between the child’s age and the parental income. This
variable captures the fact that the effect of parental income grows more relevant as
10I was not able to access a full copy of this unpublished study, but came across references to it
in multiple papers.
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the child reaches the peak earning years of the life cycle11. These controls fall short of
a perfect solution. As Mazumder remarks (2005), “...There is no simple way to deal
with measurement error problem for the dependent variable, given the lack of direct
survey data on the children in their adult years” (p. 243).
Finally, we need to consider the possibility of assortative matching in the marriage
market. There may be a positive correlation between the ability endowments of
husbands and wives, implying a correlation between spouses’ earnings. This is in
fact the case for the NLS dataset, as we can see from Table 2. If maternal income
influences the decision of how much to invest in the child’s human capital, then it will
also help determine the child’s income. Then, omitting the maternal earnings as an
explanatory variable for yit will bias the estimated effect of the father’s log earnings.
Since the allocation, not only the total, of parental earnings may be important, I
estimate a non-linear model . The relative sizes of the father-child and mother-child
elasticities will reflect the relative importance of the two spouses in the investment
decision. This of course may lead to some selection issues: the sample is made up
of children who worked, and had parents who both participated in the labor force at
some point.
2.4.1 Combined Parental Income
To establish a baseline measure of IGE for this sample, I used the pooled sample of
both male and female children and regress the child’s log permanent income on their
parents’ log permanent income. I included controls for the age of both the child and
father. In addition to a child gender dummy variable, I included an interaction of
11I only included this interaction term for the father’s income. Including an interaction term for
maternal income and the child’s age produced an insignificant parameter estimate for this variable,
probably due to the fairly high correlation of age between spouses.
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this variable with the parental income.
yi1 = α + βyi0 + β1Ai0 + β2A
2
i0 + γ1Ai1 + γ2A
2
i1+
γ3daughter + γ4(daughter) ∗ (yi0) + εi
where yi1 is the child’s current log income in year t, Ai1 controls for the age of the
child, yi0 is the log income measure for the parents (an average of all reported joint
annual income). daughter = 1 if the child is female. The purpose of this specification
is to look for evidence of a different elasticity for sons versus daughters. While the
first daughter dummy variable simply expresses the difference in means between males
and females, if the interaction term is significant and positive (negative), it implies
that at any level of a daughter’s income, her father’s permanent income has a greater
(lesser) influence on her income than it would have on her brother.
Table 2.4 shows the relevant results for the pooled OLS. The estimate of the IGE
is 0.361 in the full specification (Column 3). This regression includes the daughter
dummy and interaction term. The parameter on the interaction term daughter*log
parental income is negative but statistically insignificant. In this specification there is
no evidence that the gender of the child significantly affects the elasticity with respect
to the joint parental income.
2.4.2 Maternal versus Paternal Income
Table 2.5 shows the results the OLS regression of the child’s income on father’s
(Columns 1 and 3) and mother’s income (Columns 2 and 4). Using the individual
parent’s incomes rather than their total income yields much smaller IGE estimates
than those given in Table 2.4, only about 0.19 for paternal income, and 0.17 for ma-
ternal income. This is expected: as mentioned above, assortative matching between
parents means that including only one parent’s income will bias the IGE results down-
wards. Next, to measure the relative effects of the two parents’ incomes, I estimate
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the following non-linear model:
yi1 =α + β0 (yiFa + β1yiMo) + γ1Ai0 + γ2A
2
i0
+ γ3Ai1 + γ2A
2
i1εi
Where yiFa is the father’s log income, and yiMo is the mother’s log income. Ai1 and
Ai0 are the control variables for the child’s and father’s age at the time of the income,
as in the OLS models. The results in Table 2.6 show the results. In Columns 1-4, the
mother’s income is not significant because the sample size is too small. However the
results in Column (5) are for the pooled sample, and yield significant estimates for
the income of each parent: βˆ0 is equal to 0.238, and βˆ1 is equal to 0.491, indicating
the maternal IGE is roughly half the magnitude of the paternal IGE.
Lastly, I separated the sample into sons and daughters and ran the regression on
each gender group individually. Table 2.7 shows the results: although the IGE for
sons is slightly larger than the IGE for daughters, it is a very small difference (0.307
for daughters and 0.361 for sons). This confirms the result for the pooled regression
including the female control, which showed that the female interaction with parental
income was not significant (for comparison, the results of this model is shown again
in Column (5) of Table 2.7).
2.5 Conclusion
As a result of this analysis, I was able to estimate both the total magnitude of
the intergenerational elasticity of income, as well as to provide a decomposition of
this elasticity into paternal and maternal effects. Specifically, I found that maternal
income has a lesser effect that paternal income, but still a significant one: elasticity
attributable to the mother’s income is about one half the magnitude of the portion
due to the father’s income. However, the gender of the child does not change the
IGE results much in either the pooled or separated OLS regressions. These results
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suggest that differences in labor force participation are still driving much of the gender
differences in measured IGE. In order to add to the study, it would be useful to control
for the abiity of the child’s mother, which is measured by her AFQT score in the
NLSY79. This would be a way to estimate the fraction of IGE due to genetics.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics: Means
Children of the NLSY79, age 25+
Men Women
Year of Birth 1980.6 1980.8
Age (time of income) 27.26 27.19
Permanent Income 19,776.60 15,490.31
G2 HH income 25,761.24 25,728.96
Mother’s income 11,189.60 11,668.17
Father’s income 24,328.68 22,663.79
Mother’s age (time of income) 31.45 30.65
Father’s age (time of income) 33.94 32.59
Highest grade 12.42 13.06
Mother’s highest grade 12.41 12.67
Father’s highest grade 12.15 12.13
Female 0 1
N 337 398
All income amounts are in 2000 dollars
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Table 2.2: Permanent Income Correlation Coefficients
Child’s Log Income Father’s Log Income Mother’s Log Income
Child’s Log Income 1
Father’s Log Income 0.2215 1
Mother’s Log Income 0.1363 0.295 1
Table 2.3: Schooling Correlation Coefficients
Child’s Schooling Father’s Schooling Mother’s Schooling HH1 permanent inc.
Child’s Schooling 1
Father’s Schooling 0.2791 1
Mother’s Schooling 0.2915 0.3308 1
HH1 permanent inc. 0.3258 0.3307 0.2989 1
HH1 is the child’s parental home.
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Table 2.4: Combined Parental Income OLS
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Child’s Log Income
Parental log income 0.321*** 0.345*** 0.361***
(0.0576) (0.0628) (0.0883)
Child Age 1.573** 1.712**
(0.731) (0.726)
Child Age squared -0.0282** -0.0308**
(0.0132) (0.0131)
Dad Age -0.0169 -0.0153
(0.0348) (0.0346)
Dad Age squared 0.000129 9.84e-05
(0.000451) (0.000448)
female 0.0683
(1.185)
Female*Parental Inc -0.0348
(0.115)
Observations 572 572 572
Adjusted R2 0.050 0.054 0.069
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.5: Maternal vs Paternal Income (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Child’s Log Income
Dad’s permanent log income 0.182*** 0.189***
(0.0489) (0.0514)
Mom’s permanent log income 0.161*** 0.165***
(0.0400) (0.0442)
Child Age 1.460** 1.631**
(0.718) (0.769)
Child Age squared -0.0262** -0.0293**
(0.0130) (0.0139)
Dad Age 0.00622 -0.00706
(0.0362) (0.0379)
Dad Age squared -0.000153 3.31e-05
(0.000482) (0.000498)
Observations 582 579 582 550
Adjusted R2 0.022 0.026 0.023 0.025
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.6: Maternal vs Paternal Income Allocation (NLLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES sons daughters sons daughters all
Dad’s permanent log income 0.290*** 0.160* 0.329*** 0.163* 0.238***
(0.0950) (0.0856) (0.0967) (0.0866) (0.0649)
Mom’s permanent log income 0.192 0.780 0.263 0.891 0.491*
(0.232) (0.639) (0.217) (0.691) (0.255)
chAGE 1.887** 1.497 1.540**
(0.870) (1.470) (0.747)
chAGE2 -0.0337** -0.0263 -0.0273**
(0.0156) (0.0267) (0.0135)
dadAGE -0.0253 -0.0712 -0.0450
(0.0632) (0.0582) (0.0430)
dadAGE2 4.04e-05 0.000995 0.000495
(0.000849) (0.000776) (0.000576)
Observations 254 282 254 282 536
Adjusted R2 0.042 0.035 0.072 0.035 0.045
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.7: Sons versus Daughters (OLS) II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES sons daughters sons daughters all
Parental log income 0.334*** 0.304*** 0.384*** 0.307*** 0.361***
(0.0829) (0.0791) (0.0903) (0.0861) (0.0883)
Child Age 1.874** 1.290 1.712**
(0.877) (1.309) (0.726)
Child Age squared -0.0337** -0.0230 -0.0308**
(0.0157) (0.0237) (0.0131)
Dad Age -0.0213 -0.0449 -0.0153
(0.0453) (0.0567) (0.0346)
Dad Age squared 4.86e-05 0.000653 9.84e-05
(0.000569) (0.000764) (0.000448)
female 0.0683
(1.185)
fem F1inc -0.0348
(0.115)
Constant 6.258*** 6.294*** -19.54 -11.01 -17.36*
(0.855) (0.815) (12.31) (17.95) (10.12)
Observations 272 300 272 300 572
Adjusted R2 0.053 0.044 0.076 0.037 0.069
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter 3
Examination of the Expansion in the
College Gender Gap
3.1 Introduction
The widening college gender gap in the United States and other developed economies
is a puzzle that continues to draw attention in both the media and academic research,
but has yet to be adequately explained. Why are college completion rates for men
continuing to fall relative to those of women? Not only is the male rate failing to
keep pace with the female rate, but among certain ethnic groups (Blacks and Latinos)
they have stagnated and may even be going down. This is occurring in spite of the
increasing returns to college education, and the indisputable evidence that the lack of
a college education is linked to many negative economic outcomes, including poorer
health, lower wealth, and worse marital outcomes.
This paper asks the following questions:
1. Have men fallen behind in their average attainment for these obervable char-
acteristics? Could decreasing grades and standardized test scores explain the
drop in male college attendance? Are men taking easier courses in high school
than women are?
2. How does the relative importance of explanatory factors differ for men versus
women? Specifically, I will focus on the categories of high school academic
performance, aptitude, and family background. For example: having a single
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mother may be more harmful to men than women. Taking advanced math
classes in high school may be much more useful for women than men.
3. Has the effect of any of these proximate factors changed over time? For example,
it is possible that women have always had an advantage in high school GPA,
but that the effect of high school GPA has increased between 1980 and 1990.
3.1.1 Background
The literature on this topic primarily highlights the reversal and dramatic growth of
the U.S. college gender gap over the course of the last century. During the period
between 1900 and 1930, the ratio of male to female college graduates was actually at
parity, as documented by Goldin (1995) and Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko (2006). In
the 1930s male enrollments began to increase relative to female enrollments, and GI
Bills following WWII and the Korean War accelerated this trend. According to data
from the US Census, among those aged 25-29, the M/F college graduate ratio peaked
around 1952 at 2.1. At this time the college graduation rate for young men was more
than double the rate for young women (13.8% versus 6.7%; see Figure 3·1). However,
female college attendance began catching up in the 1950s, and college enrollment
of the two genders returned to parity around 1980. Since then, the college gender
gap has reversed dramatically. In 2011, 28.4% of young men in this age group had
completed college, compared with a rate of 36.1% for women. About 58% of new
college graduates are women.
Goldin et al. demonstrate that women’s aptitude scores and high school perfor-
mance in the 1950s and 1960s were much closer to men than their lagging college
attendance rates would imply. Changes in the women’s labor market accelerated
in the 1970s (related to changes in the marriage market, birth control, and cultural
norms) and expanded career opportunites for women, thereby increasing the financial
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returns to women of attending college. In the early 1970s, the typical female college
graduate was married within a year of receiving her degree, and had only a 40.5%
chance of participating in the labor force after marriage1. Since that time, women’s
median age at marriage has been increasing, from 21 years in 1970 to 26 years in 2010,
as has the median age of first childbirth for college educated women. This means that
women are more likely to work after college. Additionally, they are more likely to
continue working after being married: the participation rate of married women was
50% in 1980 and over 60% in 2000.
In light of these dynamics, the convergence in college attendance rates for men
and women that occured from the 1950s to the 1980s is not excessively surprising.
What is remarkable is that women have moved beyond equality with men, and in the
current graduating college class the ratio of women to men is nearly 1.4. While it is
true that women without a BA are more likely to live in poverty than high school
degree bearing men2, there is no clear evidence that the lifetime economic returns of
a bachelor’s degree are higher for women than for men3. When measured as the mean
wage of a college graduate over a high school graduate, the college premium is still
higher for men than for women.
3.1.2 Possible explanations for the growing gap
Both the increasing college graduation rate of young women, as well as the lagging
and subsequently decreasing college graduation rate for young men act to exacerbate
1Data from the U.S. Census. The participation rate for married men at this time was 86.1%. It
has since fallen to about 75.8%.
2See Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss (2009). This is due in part to the better marriage prospects
for women, and the fact that women without a college degree are more likely to be single mothers.
DiPrete and Buchmann (2005, 2006) point to the important role education plays as insurance against
poverty, in particular for young women. Completing college reduces poverty for women through
higher wages, of course, but also by diminishing the risk for single motherhood as well as the risk of
divorce.
3However, Dougherty (2005) points out that most U.S. studies do find higher returns to years
of schooling for women then for men.
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the male disadvantage in the college gender gap. It is not obvious why male college
rates have fallen so far behind those for women, although a few reasons have been
discussed. Recent research by Dwyer et al. (2012) has suggested that men are less
willing than women to incur debt in order to finish college. This is consistent with the
fact that the female to male college ratio is much more extreme for low socioeconomic
status students, who are more likely to rely on financing to complete college. Since the
college gender gap is especially severe among poor and minority households, it could
be that the expected financial rewards to college differ depending on socieconomic
status. Studies by Altonji and Dunn (1996) find no difference in returns to schooling
by family background, and Barrow and Rouse (2005) find that returns to schooling are
relatively constant across race and ethnicity. However, these studies do not specifically
measure the returns to college.
Another possible explanation for the male disadvantage is a higher rate of behav-
ioral disorders in young men than in young women. Heckman and Rubinstein (2001)
show that early childhood traits and behaviors have significant effects on economic
outcomes in adulthood, specifically in attaining a high school diploma over a GED,
and for wages. Bertrand and Pan (2011) point out that behavioral problems in high
school boys are associated with a decreased likelihood of completing high school and
subsequently a decreased likelihood of attending college. Another study by Turner
(2004) suggests that people with a GED may lack the committment to complete
college.
Male high school students continue to outperform females on standardized tests
(particularly in math). They also have not significantly changed their class percentile
rankings (see Figures 3·2 and 3·3), or levels of college preparedness measured by the
number of advanced classes taken in high school, etc. However, behavioral factors
may be preventing men from succeeding in college, working through some additional
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mechanism besides high school academic success.
Family background might also be part of the explanation. The share of all children
living with only one parent rose from 20% in 1979 to 29% in 19974. There is some evi-
dence that single mothers spend less time engaging with their male children than their
female children. If these differences in parenting affect college success, or if growing
up with a single mother adversely affects boys more than girls, the increase in single
motherhood would result in a widening of the college gender gap. McLanahan and
Sandefur (1994) argue that children of single mothers perform worse on standardized
tests and complete less education than children raised by two parents. Hetherington
et al. (1998) and Elwood and Jencks (2004) point out that the negative outcomes
associated with single mothers are hard to disentangle from the correlated effects of
poverty, addiction, lack of stability, and others.
Collectively, the existing studies point to a wide range of potential explanations
for the increase in the college gender gap. The contribution of this paper is to estimate
the relative importance for college success of three types of explanatory factors: family
background, school performance, and natural ability. I use data from two comparable
samples in the National Longitudinal Survey (NLSY79 and NLSY97) and decompose
the college gender gaps for each sample, as well as the change in this gap over the
two periods. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 explains the
empirical strategy, section 3.3 describes the data, section 3.4 discusses the results,
and section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
In order to answer questions 1 and 2, regarding changes in attributes versus changes
in returns, I implement an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the education gaps (see
Oaxaca (1973), Blinder (1973)). This decomposition separates two types of changes
4Data from CPS, in Ellwood and Jencks (2004).
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that could account for why the gender gap increased between the 1979 and 1997 NLSY
samples. Firstly, women may have disproportionately improved their average levels of
attainment in their observable characteristics, such as high school rank, mathematical
ability, or standardized test scores. Secondly, the relative importance attributed to
these characteristics may have changed over time so that certain achievements now
favor women more then men. College entrance and completion for men and women,
YMi and YFi, can be expressed as:
YMi = βMXMi + iM
YFi = βFXFi + iF
Where XM and XY are vectors of explanatory variables from three categories: aca-
demic factors, aptitude, and family background.
The gender gap can therefore be expressed as the difference between the mean
values of Y for men and women:
Y M − Y F = βˆM(XM −XF ) + (βˆM − βˆF )XF
Where Y¯M and Y¯F are the average completion rates for men and women, respectively.
We can measure the difference in mean education outcomes for both the NLSY79 and
NLSY97, and estimate the contribution from each of the two terms on the right hand
side. Estimation of βˆM(XM −XF ) gives the explained component: the contribution
of differences in attributes between men and women. The value of (βˆM − βˆF )XF is
the unexplained portion: the amount of the gap due to differences in returns to men
and women.5
To look more closely at differences in returns for men and women, I also test for
significance of interaction terms between explanatory variable and a Female indicator.
5There are two ways to weight the explained and unexplained components. See Appendix B for
the alternative weighting.
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From:
Yit = β0t + β1tXit + β2tFEMit + β3tFEMit ∗Xit + it
Test:
H0 : βˆ3t = 0
for t=1979, 1997.
To address question 3: with respect to the expansion of the female advantage over
time (or, equivalently, the increasingly negative value of YM − YF ), the change is due
to both changes in relative male and female attributes (changes in XM −XF ) as well
as an adjustment in the relative importance of the explanatory variables (changes in
βM − βF over time). The decomposition of the gap expansion between time t=0 and
t=T can be written as:6
(
Y¯M1 − Y¯F1
)− (Y¯M0 − Y¯F0) = βˆF0 [(X¯M1 − X¯F1)− (X¯M0 − X¯F0)]
+
(
βˆM0 − βˆF0
) (
X¯M1 − X¯M0
)
+
(
βˆF1 − βˆF0
) (
X¯M1 − X¯F1
)
+
[
(βˆM1 − βˆF1)− (βˆM0 − βˆF0)
]
X¯M1
This framework separates the change in the college gender gap that is due to a
shifting relationship between the explanatory variables and college completion from
the change that is arising because women’s endowments in the explanatory vari-
ables are increasing relative to men. The contribution to the increased gap of the
change in women’s relative endowments is equal to the first term in the above equa-
tion, βˆF0
[(
X¯M1 − X¯F1
)− (X¯M0 − X¯F0)]. The fourth term of the decomposition,[
(βˆM1 − βˆF1)− (βˆM0 − βˆF0)
]
X¯M1, is the component due to the change in relative
6As above, there are several different ways to decompose the increase in the gap. See Appendix
B.
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coefficients.7
We can also check whether or not coefficients have changed over time for men
and/or for women by pooling together the NLSY79 (Sample 1) and NLSY97 (Sample
2) and estimating the following relationship. SAMP2 is an indicator for the NLSY97
sample, and FEM is the Female dummy.
Yi = β0 + β1Xi + β2FEMi + β3 (FEMi ∗Xi) + β4SAMP2i+
β5 (SAMP2i ∗Xi) + β6 (SAMP2i ∗ FEMi) + β7 (SAMP2i ∗ FEMi ∗Xi) + i
(a) To check if coefficients have changed for men over time, test
H0 : βˆ5 = 0
(b) To test for any change in coefficients for women:
H0 : βˆ5 + βˆ7 = 0
3.3 Data
The data comes from the NLSY79 and NLSY97. The individuals in the sample are
natural citizens, civilians in adulthood, who answered questions about their completed
education at age 19 and age 25, and for whom there is household income data available
for at least one year during which they were living with their parent(s) and aged 14-
17.8 Those from the NLSY79 were born between 1960 and 1964, and those from the
NLSY97 were born between 1980 and 1984. Table 3.1 breaks down the summary
means for men and women in the two surveys, along with gender differences and
7The cross terms (the second and third terms of this decomposition) change slightly depending
on which decomposition is used. They account for the fact that relative attributes and relative
returns to attributes are changing simultaneously. In this case, the second term is equal to the
initial male premium multiplied by the absolute increase in male attributes. The third term is equal
to the increased returns to females multiplied by the final male advantage in observable attributes.
See Appendix B for alternative cross term forms.
8See Appendix A for an accounting of the sample size resulting from the data requirements.
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the difference in differences. The table shows a statistically significant change in the
college gender gap, but the only explanatory characteristics that have statistically
significant changes in the male-female difference are the high school courses: the
numbers of math, science and foreign language courses taken in high school.
The independent variables used as regressors include demographic controls (dummy
variables for female, black, hispanic, birth year, and three of four U.S. regions, year of
birth dummy variables), family background (parental log average income in 2000 dol-
lars, education dummies for both parents, mother’s age at first birth and at youth’s
birth, and a control for growing up with a single mother), academic performance in
high school (a cubic in class percentile, the number of math, foreign language, and
science courses completed), and aptitude (normalized percentile scores in the AFQT
exam)9. To gauge the gender differences in the contribution of each control variable,
a full set of interactions of FEM with each regressor is included.
The rates of college entry and college completion are heterogeneous across the
income distribution. Table 3.2 summarizes rates of educational attainment across
income quartiles for both the NLSY79 and the NLSY97 samples. The income quartiles
are calculated using the average real household income (parental income in 2000
dollars) while the youth was between the ages of 14 and 17 and living in her parental
home. If the household income was not reported for one (or more) of these years,
the average is based on all available years. Percentiles are created using the baseline
cross sectional weights to approximate the national income distribution.
The top panel of Table 3.2 displays the rates for the NSLY79 sample, made up
9Class percentile note: In the 1979 sample, class rank and class size are both available, so each
individual’s true class percentile can be calculated. However in the 1997 sample, only categorical
data is available for class size: class size is given as up to 100, 101-220, 223-330, 331-470, and larger
than 470. In order to create comparable measures of class rank across the two samples, I created
a categorical class size measure for the early sample, and defined a measure of approximate class
percentile for both samples as 1-(the raw class rank/upper bound of class size category). Then I
used the within-sample percentile of the approximate measure as my the class rank measurement.
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of individuals from birth cohorts 1960-1964. The bottom panel is for the sample
from the NLSY97, born in 1980 to 1984. Following the method used by Bailey and
Dynarski (2011), college entrance is defined as attempting at least 13 years of school
by age 19, and the college graduation rate is defined as the share of the sample that
has completed 16 years of school by age 25. For reference, the rate of high school
graduation, defined as completing 12 years of school by age 19, is also included.
The college entrance and college completion rates increased across income quartiles
between the earlier and later sample. The slope of both these rates is steeper in
the later cohort, indicating an increased relationship between income and higher
education.
Table 3.3 shows the education rates for all men and all women in each respective
sample, and the female to male ratio is calculated for each measure. These ratios are
plotted in Figure 3·4. The data from the NLSY show similar high school graduation
rates for men relative to women in the 1979 and 1997 samples.10 The high school
graduation rates are quite stable for both men and women, as is the female to male
ratio of this rate. Although the female to male ratio for college entrance declined
slightly between the 1979 sample and the 1997 sample, the college completion ratio
increased from 1.06 to 1.48. These statistics echo the pattern described by Goldin,
Katz and Kuziemko (2006).
Figure 3·4 plots the female to male college graduation ratio for each income quar-
tile in the two samples. The female to male college ratios in the earlier sample
(NLSY79) do not show a clear monotonic trend, but these ratios are decreasing in
income for the more recent sample (NLSY97). In particular, quartiles 1 and 2 are
10Heckman and LaFontaine (2010) estimate the “true” high school graduation rate for the NLSY
samples by imputing GED rates and argue that after this adjustment there is an observable gender
gap in high school graduation rates. They estimate that roughly half of the increase in the college
attendance gender gap can be explained by increases in males who drop out of high school, or who
receive GEDs rather than high school diplomas. Nevertheless, this is not portrayed as a causal
relationship: the factors that result in a GED also result in lower college graduation rates.
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the most extreme at 1.61 and 1.81. Both the college entrance ratio and college com-
pletion ratio are lowest for individuals in the fourth quartile in the NLSY97. This
figure suggests that income may have an impact on the recent expansion of the college
gender gap.
Ability measures, course choice and high school grades are likely to be correlated
with the student’s gender. Additionally, it is possible that household income and
household structure are not independent of gender: girls may be more likely to live
with single mothers, and as a result be more likely to live in a low income household.
The gender gap could be affected by male-female differences in the average quantities
of these characteristics, as well as by differences in coefficients. However, certain other
factors, such as parental education, should not be correlated with gender. These
factors can only contribute to the gender gap if their effects on education are greater
for women than for men (or vice versa).
Table 3.4 shows that in the NLSY97 sample, both poverty and having a single
mother for a parent are associated with a lower college enrollment male to female
ratio. In Table 3.4, the income levels of 1979 single mother households are more or
less comparable to households below the median. We can see in the upper panel that
male students with a single mother do not appear to be at a disadvantage compared to
male students from the comparable income group. Rather, the female to male ratio for
high school graduation, college entrance, and college graduation are all more extreme
in the low income group than in the single mother group. However, the single mother
group in the NLSY97 has higher male to femle education ratio than the comparison
group (households from the lower three income quartiles11). In particular, the college
entrance ratio for 1997 single mom households is 1.37, compared to the low income
11In the NLSY 1979, average income for the single mother households was $29,502, and mean
income for families below the median was $31,541. In the 1997 sample, mean income in single mother
families was 35,658 in 2000 dollars, and the mean for families below the 75th percentile was $35,467.
All monetary amounts are in 2000 dollars.
86
ratio of 1.35. The 1997 single mom college graduation ratio is 1.71, considerably
higher than the low income ratio, 1.57.
3.4 Empirical Results
Table 3.5 displays the decomposition of the 1979 and 1997 gaps into attributes and
coefficients. In the 1979 sample, we observe a significant gender gap in College En-
trance: men are 8.8 percentage points below women. None of this gap is explained by
a female advantage in characteristics; it is all unexplained, or due to gender differences
in returns to the characteristics on college entrance. The gap for College Entrance
in the 1997 sample is wider (men are at at 12.2 point disadvantage). However, now
there is a portion of this gap due to higher attributes in women than men. The share
of the 12.2 point gap eplained by the female characteristics is 40.2%. For College
Graduation, the 1979 gap is close to zero (men have a college graduation rate that
is 1.6 percentage points higher than women). The observable characteristics actually
predict a slight advantage to women of 2.5 percentage points. As a result, a male
advantage of 4.06 points is attributed to the gender difference in coefficients. How-
ever, the college graduation gap is 12.9 percentage points in the 1997 sample. Of the
12.9 points, 6.6 points are due to differences in characteristics, and 6.4 points are due
differences in returns that favor women. This is in sharp contrast to the 1979 sample,
in which the differences in returns favored men.
Table 3.6 addresses question 3: How much of the increase in the college gender
gap is due to observable characteristics? Terms 1-4 reflect the terms of the gap
expansion decomposition. Term 1 indicates that 6.8 of the 13 point gap (46.7%) is
due to the change over time in the gender gap in returns, βM − βF . Term 4 indicates
that 5.7 of the 13 point gap (44%) is due to the change over time in the gender gap
in characteristics, XM −XF .
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The table also breaks down the explained and unexplained components into four
groups of variables: family background, school performance, ability, and group fixed
effects. Family background includes the parents’ socioeconomic factors, race, and
household structure (having a single mother). Family background is a negligible
portion of the explained component, but it dominates the unexplained portion. This
means that the effect of family background is disproportionately hurting the college
graduation rates of men. School performance (class rank and high school courses)
is the majority (2/3) of the explained increase in the gender gap. Notice that the
school performance portion of the unexplained term actually acts against the female
advantage. If the returns to school performance with respect to college were equal for
men and women, all else equal, the college gender gap would expand even further.
The effect of ability (measured as the normalized AFQT score) is very tiny in the
unexplained component (i.e. relative effects of ability are not driving the gender gap),
but about 30% of the explained component. This result is somewhat ambiguous. The
direct interpretation is that women have increased their relative AFQT scores relative
to men (shown in the last row of Table 3.1), and this has contributed to widening the
college gap (about 1.75 percentage points of the total 14.5 percentage point increase).
However, since the AFQT is supposed to reflect natural ability, changes in the relative
scores of men and women are more likely to reflect changes in the gender bias of the
testing methodology. It is possible these changes are correlated with new gender
biases that also affect college success, but that conclusion is beyond the scope of this
study.
Table 3.7 shows the the F-test results for joint significance of the set of controls
interacted with the female indicator.12 In both samples, we see that there is no
evidence of a significant gender difference in the coefficients with respect to college
entrance. However, there is evidence that coefficients between men and women differ
12The full regression results for all the F-tests are displayed in Appendix C.
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with respect to college graduation. This is an interesting result because it suggests
that men and women have similar intentions or expectations when they enroll in
college, but for some reason the men have a more difficult time completing college.
Table 3.8 tests the change in coefficients over time for men and women. From the
top half of the panel, the F-test indicates stable coefficients over time for men, but
the coefficients have changed significantly for women with respect to both high school
graduation and college graduation. This means that the unexplained portion of the
increased college gap (Term 4 in Table 3.5) is coming from changes in the female
parameters rather than the male parameters.
3.5 Conclusion
The decomposition results in this study show that female characteristics do predict
some advantage for women in college graduation rates, and even predicted a small
advantage in the earlier sample (NLSY79). However, the observable characteristics
do not explain the full gap in the NLSY97 sample, or the increased size of the gap
between the 1979 and 1997 samples. In the NLSY97, there is a substantial female
advantage in college graduation. Roughly half of the observed college graduation
gender gap in the NLSY97 is due to advantages in women’s characteristics, and
roughly half is “unexplained” (due to gender differences in the coefficients). With
respect to the increase in the gender gap, 40% can be attributed to changes in the
relative endowments of women, and 47% is due to changes in relative returns to these
endowments.
Overall there is some evidence that poverty or household structure affects ado-
lescent boys more than girls, and that this differential effect has contributed to the
growth of the college gender gap. By breaking down the explained and unexplained
portion of the increased gender gap, the results indicate that the male coefficient
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effect of family background is huge in comparison to all the other variables.
The results from this study are clearly not enough to conclude a causal relation-
ships between family background and college success. There are certainly cultural
or other unobserval factors that impact both family background and college gradu-
ation. However, these findings do have useful public policy implications. The fact
that family background is potentially a strong predictor this gap means that policies
aimed at helping men succeed in college would be the most effective if they targeted
men from lower income, lower educated, or single mother households. Secondly, these
results show that policies aimed only at encouraging men to enroll in college will not
address the additional imbalance that occurs between enrollment and graduation. For
example, in addition to increasing access to college financing, policy makers should
encourage more work-study opportunities and make it easier to refinance student
loans.
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Figure 3·1: Decreasing M/F BA Ratio
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Figure 3·2: NLSY79: Gender Composition of Class Rank Quartiles
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Figure 3·3: NLSY97: Gender Composition of Class Rank Quartiles
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Figure 3·4: Female to Male Ratio by Income
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Table 3.1: Summary of Differences: Means
1979 1997
Women Men W-M Women Men W-M 4W-M
HS Grad 19 0.8503 0.7733 0.0770*** 0.8207029 0.7623556 0.0583*** -0.0186
(0.0137) (0.0114) (0.0174)
College Entrance 19 0.3863 0.2952 0.0912*** 0.5750415 0.4573462 0.118*** 0.0265
(0.0166) (0.0139) (0.0212)
BA grad 25 0.1952 0.1847 0.0104 0.3321611 0.224132 0.108*** 0.0976***
(0.0138) (0.0125) (0.0184)
Parental net income 54,209 55,330 -1,120 58,443.94 59,224.11 -780.2 340.1
(1,105) (1,395) (1,825)
mom HS 0.6424 0.6684 -0.0259 0.8141841 0.8203971 -0.00621 0.0197
(0.0167) (0.0108) (0.0190)
mom BA 0.0967 0.0909 0.00585 0.2208882 0.2358321 -0.0149 -0.0208
(0.0102) (0.0118) (0.0158)
dad HS 0.6061 0.6187 -0.0126 0.7368904 0.7558206 -0.0189 -0.00637
(0.0171) (0.0122) (0.0203)
dad BA 0.1558 0.1646 -0.00875 0.2259308 0.2337458 -0.00781 0.000932
(0.0129) (0.0118) (0.0173)
mom age 1st birth 21.7831 21.9301 -0.147 23.26407 23.31295 -0.0489 0.0982
(0.169) (0.136) (0.211)
mom age youth’s birth 25.8924 25.9305 -0.0381 25.41374 25.75927 -0.346** -0.307
(0.234) (0.148) (0.262)
Single mom 0.1384 0.1309 0.00750 0.3999897 0.364958 0.0350** 0.0275
(0.0120) (0.0136) (0.0184)
Class pctile 0.5478 0.4494 0.0984*** 0.5452445 0.4535146 0.0917*** -0.00668
(0.0129) (0.0110) (0.0167)
# math 1.9585 2.2065 -0.248*** 4.510813 4.345821 0.165* 0.413***
(0.0511) (0.0921) (0.111)
# foreign language 0.7842 0.5806 0.204*** 2.395279 1.766844 0.628*** 0.425***
(0.0375) (0.0659) (0.0800)
# science 1.7218 1.8237 -0.102** 3.945449 3.793721 0.152* 0.254**
(0.0495) (0.0845) (0.103)
AFQT age pctile 50.6300 49.8994 0.731 53.59627 51.92472 1.672* 0.941
(1.037) (0.881) (1.346)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
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Table 3.2: Education by Parental Income Quartile
NLSY79: Birth Cohorts 1960-1964
Quartile HS Graduate College Entrance BA Graduate
1 64.26% 19.91% 6.63%
2 80.70% 27.17% 14.43%
3 87.12% 36.65% 18.53%
4 92.01% 53.96% 38.45%
NLSY97: Birth Cohorts 1980-1984
Quartile HS Graduate College Entrance BA Graduate
1 59.72% 26.97% 9.41%
2 77.75% 44.56% 20.01%
3 87.91% 61.89% 34.49%
4 92.58% 75.03% 48.99%
Source: NLSY79 and NLSY97. Sample includes all natural citizens who
responded to questions about their completed education at age 19
and age 25. High School Graduates are those whocompleted at least
12 grades of school by age 19. College entrance is defined as attempting
at least 13 years of school by age 19. The BA rate is the share of the
sample completing at least 16 years of school by age 25.
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Table 3.3: Education by Gender
NLSY79: Birth Cohorts 1960-1964
HS Graduate College Entrance BA Graduate
Men 77.33% 29.52% 18.47%
Women 85.03% 38.63% 19.52%
F/M Ratio 1.10 1.31 1.06
NLSY97: Birth Cohorts 1980-1984
HS Graduate College Entrance BA Graduate
Men 76.24% 45.73% 22.41%
Women 82.07% 57.50% 33.22%
F/M Ratio 1.08 1.26 1.48
Source: NLSY79 and NLSY97. See Table 1.
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Table 3.4: Education by Household Structure and Gender
NLSY79: Birth Cohorts 1960-1964
Single Mom HS Graduate College Entrance BA Graduate
Men 0 78.8% 30.3% 19.1%
Women 0 86.9% 39.6% 20.9%
F/M ratio 0 1.10 1.31 1.09
Men 1 67.7% 24.5% 14.4%
Women 1 73.1% 32.7% 11.0%
F/M ratio 1 1.08 1.33 0.77
Income below median HS Graduate College Entrance BA Graduate
Men 69.0% 17.7% 9.6%
Women 77.5% 30.4% 12.1%
F/M ratio 1.12 1.72 1.26
NLSY79: Birth Cohorts 1980-1984
Single Mom HS Graduate College Entrance BA Graduate
Men 0 84.2% 54.1% 29.1%
Women 0 88.9% 67.3% 43.1%
F/M ratio 0 1.06 1.24 1.48
Men 1 62.4% 31.2% 10.8%
Women 1 71.8% 42.7% 18.4%
F/M ratio 1 1.15 1.37 1.71
Income below 75th Pct. HS Graduate College Entrance BA Graduate
Men 71.7% 37.8% 16.5%
Women 78.2% 50.8% 25.9%
F/M ratio 1.09 1.35 1.57
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Table 3.5: Decomposition I of College Gender Gap
NLSY79
HS Grad College Entrance College Grad
Group 1 (Males) 0.945*** 0.397*** 0.279***
(0.00812) (0.0174) (0.0159)
Group 2 (Females) 0.967*** 0.485*** 0.263***
(0.00596) (0.0165) (0.0146)
Difference -0.0219** -0.0880*** 0.0160
(0.0101) (0.0240) (0.0216)
Explained 0.000802 0.00211 -0.0246
(0.00668) (0.0165) (0.0160)
Unexplained -0.0227** -0.0901*** 0.0406**
(0.0115) (0.0237) (0.0201)
Obs. 1,734 1,734 1,734
NLSY97
HS Grad age 19 College Entrance age 19 College Grad age 25
Group 1 (Males) 0.924*** 0.603*** 0.307***
(0.00816) (0.0150) (0.0142)
Group (Females) 0.940*** 0.725*** 0.436***
(0.00696) (0.0131) (0.0146)
Difference -0.0166 -0.122*** -0.129***
(0.0107) (0.0200) (0.0203)
Explained -0.00469 -0.0530*** -0.0611***
(0.00610) (0.0134) (0.0137)
Unexplained -0.0119 -0.0690*** -0.0683***
(0.0108) (0.0183) (0.0172)
Obs. 2,245 2,245 2,245
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.6: Decomposition of Change in College Gender Gap
College Graduate by age 25
NLSY 1979 NLSY 1979
Group 1 (Males) 0.2785 0.3066
Group 2 (Females) 0.2625 0.4361
Difference (M-F) 0.0160 -0.1295
4 Difference -0.1454
Explained: βˆF0
[(
X¯M1 − X¯F1
)− (X¯M0 − X¯F0)] -0.05713***
(0.00851)
Term 2:
(
βˆM0 − βˆF0
) (
X¯M1 − X¯M0
)
-0.0140
(0.06441)
Term 3:
(
X¯M1 − X¯F1
) (
βˆF1 − βˆF0
)
-0.0067
(0.01255)
Unexplained: X¯M1
[
(βˆM1 − βˆF1)− (βˆM0 − βˆF0)
]
-0.0568
(0.07117)
Breakdown of Explained
Family Background -0.00327
School Performance -0.03783
Ability (AFQT) -0.01753
Group fixed effects 0.00150
Breakdown of Unexplained
Family Background -0.63124
School Performance 0.05772
Ability (AFQT) -0.00252
Group fixed effects 0.5192
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.7: Comparison of Male and Female Coefficients
Test for Male-Female difference in NLSY79
HS Grad College Entrance College Grad
F-test(20, 1692) 1.71 0.92 2.20
Prob > F 0.0262 0.5570 0.0017
Obs. 1,734 1,734 1,734
Test for Male-Female difference in NLSY97
HS Grad College Entrance College Grad
F-test(20, 2202) 1.92 1.98 1.34
Prob > F 0.0084 0.0058 0.1417
Obs. 2,242 2,242 2,242
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Table 3.8: Comparison of NLSY79 and NLSY97
Have coefficients changed over time for males?
HS Grad College Entrance College Grad
F-test(20, 3896) 0.0955 0.0379 0.0445
Prob > F 1.0 1.0 1.0
Have coefficients changed over time for females?
HS Grad College Entrance College Grad
F-test(39, 3896) 2.057 0.980 1.375
Prob > F 0.000128 0.506 0.0609
Obs. 3,979 3,979 3,979
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Appendix A: Data Appendix
Table A-1 lists the required restrictions for the dataset, and accounts for the sample
size used in the empirical analysis.
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Appendix B: Alternative Decompositions
For the basic decomposition of the college gender gap, Basic I refers to:
Y¯Mt − Y¯Ft = βˆMt
(
X¯Mt − X¯Ft
)
+ X¯Ft
(
βˆMt − βˆFt
)
The alternative weighting of the explained and unexplained components is the fol-
lowing, referred to as Basic II.
Y¯Mt − Y¯Ft = βˆFt
(
X¯Mt − X¯Ft
)
+ X¯Mt
(
βˆMt − βˆFt
)
The estimates for the Basic II are given in Table B-1. A comparison of the upper
panels of Table 3.5 and B-1 show that the choice of weights can change the results
quite a bit. In particular, Table refoaxaca2 indicates that in the NLSY79, both
characteristics and coefficients act to increase the male advantage. However, these
estimates are not statistically significant. The Basic II weighting did not much alter
the results for college graduation in the NLSY97 panel. The lower panel of Table
B-1 shows a fairly even contribution of characteristics and coefficients to the female
advantage in college graduation. The share of the gender gap attributed to coefficients
is slightly greater when using Basic II than Basic I.
Similarly, the decomposition of the difference in differences can also be weighted
in various ways. The starting point for the decomposition uses either Basic I or Basic
II for the terms
(
Y¯M1 − Y¯F1
)
and
(
Y¯M0 − Y¯F0
)
. Then, the basic structure of the
decomposition depends on which intermediate terms are grouped together. The basic
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structure will be either: Structure I:
(
Y¯M1 − Y¯F1
)− (Y¯M0 − Y¯F0) = A [(X¯M1 − X¯F1)− (X¯M0 − X¯F0)]
+B
(
X¯M1 − X¯F1
)
+ C
(
βˆM0 − βˆF0
)
+D
[(
βˆM1 − βˆF1
)
−
(
βˆM0 − βˆF0
)]
or Structure II:
(
Y¯M1 − Y¯F1
)− (Y¯M0 − Y¯F0) = A [(X¯M1 − X¯F1)− (X¯M0 − X¯F0)]
+B
(
X¯M0 − X¯F0
)
+ C
(
βˆM0 − βˆF0
)
+D
[(
βˆM1 − βˆF1
)
−
(
βˆM0 − βˆF0
)]
Using Structure I and Basic I, the decomposition is written as:
1.
(
Y¯M1 − Y¯F1
)− (Y¯M0 − Y¯F0) = βˆM0 [(X¯M1 − X¯F1)− (X¯M0 − X¯F0)]
+
(
βˆM1 − βˆF0
) (
X¯M0 − X¯F0
)
+
(
X¯F1 − X¯M0
) (
βˆM0 − βˆF0
)
+ X¯F1
[(
βˆM1 − βˆF1
)
−
(
βˆM0 − βˆF0
)]
Using Structure I and Basic II:
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2.
(
Y¯M1 − Y¯F1
)− (Y¯M0 − Y¯F0) = βˆF1 [(X¯M1 − X¯F1)− (X¯M0 − X¯F0)]
+
(
βˆF1 − βˆM0
) (
X¯M0 − X¯F0
)
+
(
X¯M1 − X¯F0
) (
βˆM0 − βˆF0
)
+ X¯M1
[(
βˆM1 − βˆF1
)
−
(
βˆM0 − βˆF0
)]
Using Structure II and Basic II:
3.
(
Y¯M1 − Y¯F1
)− (Y¯M0 − Y¯F0) = βˆM1 [(X¯M1 − X¯F1)− (X¯M0 − X¯F0)]
+
(
βˆM1 − βˆM0
) (
X¯M0 − X¯F0
)
+
(
X¯F1 − X¯F0
) (
βˆM0 − βˆF0
)
+ X¯F1
[(
βˆM1 − βˆF1
)
−
(
βˆM0 − βˆF0
)]
Using Structure II and Basic II:
4.
(
Y¯M1 − Y¯F1
)− (Y¯M0 − Y¯F0) = βˆF1 [(X¯M1 − X¯F1)− (X¯M0 − X¯F0)]
+
(
βˆF1 − βˆF0
) (
X¯M0 − X¯F0
)
+
(
X¯M1 − X¯M0
) (
βˆM0 − βˆF0
)
+ X¯M1
[(
βˆM1 − βˆF1
)
−
(
βˆM0 − βˆF0
)]
Notice that we could write eight additional versions of the decomposition by using
Basic I and Basic II together, but the benefit of this method is not clear. In every
possible decomposition, the explained term is always
A
[(
X¯M1 − X¯F1
)− (X¯M0 − X¯F0)]
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and the unexplained term is always
D
[(
βˆM1 − βˆF1
)
−
(
βˆM0 − βˆF0
)]
.
The cross terms in each expression (weighted by B and C) are for accounting purposes,
and represent the fact that attributes and returns are changing simultaneously for
both groups.
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Table B-1: Decomposition II of College Gender Gap
NLSY79
HS Grad age 19 College Entrance age 19 College Grad age 25
Group 1 (Males) 0.945*** 0.397*** 0.279***
(0.00812) (0.0174) (0.0159)
Group 2 (Females) 0.967*** 0.485*** 0.263***
(0.00596) (0.0165) (0.0146)
Difference -0.0219** -0.0880*** 0.0160
(0.0101) (0.0240) (0.0216)
Explained -0.00391 0.0195 0.00312
(0.00493) (0.0167) (0.0156)
Unexplained -0.0180* -0.107*** 0.0129
(0.0109) (0.0237) (0.0199)
Obs. 1,734 1,734 1,734
NLSY97
HS Grad age 19 College Entrance age 19 College Grad age 25
Group 1 (Males) 0.924*** 0.603*** 0.307***
(0.00816) (0.0150) (0.0142)
Group (Females) 0.940*** 0.725*** 0.436***
(0.00696) (0.0131) (0.0146)
Difference -0.0166 -0.122*** -0.129***
(0.0107) (0.0200) (0.0203)
Explained -0.00942* -0.0532*** -0.0567***
(0.0108) (0.0202) (0.0186)
Unexplained -0.00719 -0.0688*** -0.0728***
(0.0107) (0.0180) (0.0174)
Obs. 2,245 2,245 2,245
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Appendix C: Additional regressions
The set of Tables C-1 to C-6 show the results for OLS regressions of the full set
of explanatory variables on high school completion, college entrance, and college
completion. These regressions check for gender differences in the effects of individual
characteristics by comparing the regression coefficients for men and women. The
three columns in each of the Tables C-1 to C-6 represent the coefficients for (1) only
women, (2) only men, (3) the female interaction term coefficients from the full sample.
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Table C-1: High School Gender Gap in Cohort 1 NLSY79
NLSY79 HSGRAD
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES F M βF − βM
black 0.00536 -0.0165 0.0219
(0.0225) (0.0309) (0.0375)
hispanic -0.0641** 0.0199 -0.0840*
(0.0293) (0.0402) (0.0488)
Parents’ log income 0.0130 0.00665 0.00637
(0.0124) (0.0168) (0.0205)
classpctile 0.189 1.076*** -0.887***
(0.225) (0.253) (0.340)
classpct 2 -0.101 -2.113*** 2.012***
(0.497) (0.603) (0.778)
classpct 3 -0.00817 1.222*** -1.231**
(0.317) (0.406) (0.510)
# of HS math courses 0.00214 0.00562 -0.00348
(0.00585) (0.00672) (0.00893)
# of HS for. language courses 0.00347 0.00509 -0.00162
(0.00603) (0.00829) (0.0101)
# of HS science courses 0.00149 -0.000242 0.00173
(0.00534) (0.00649) (0.00837)
AFQT 0.00395 0.0369*** -0.0329**
(0.0101) (0.0116) (0.0154)
mom HS 0.00414 0.0563** -0.0522**
(0.0156) (0.0219) (0.0264)
mom BA -0.0121 -0.0419 0.0299
(0.0212) (0.0277) (0.0344)
dad HS 0.0219 -0.0332 0.0551**
(0.0145) (0.0206) (0.0247)
dad BA -0.000306 -0.0187 0.0183
(0.0183) (0.0223) (0.0287)
Mother’s Age FB 3.35e-05 0.000236 -0.000202
(0.00173) (0.00242) (0.00292)
Mother’s Age YB -0.000935 0.00127 -0.00221
(0.00120) (0.00171) (0.00204)
singmom -0.0325 0.0210 -0.0535
(0.0214) (0.0279) (0.0347)
female 0.0931
(0.230)
Constant 0.778*** 0.684*** 0.684***
(0.141) (0.186) (0.167)
Observations 926 808 1,734
Adjusted R2 0.038 0.087 0.069
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Region and year dummy coefficients not shown.
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Table C-2: College Entrance Gender Gap in Cohort 1 NLSY79
NLSY79 ENTER
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES F M βF − βM
black 0.164*** 0.234*** -0.0699
(0.0556) (0.0599) (0.0818)
hispanic 0.0949 0.0539 0.0411
(0.0725) (0.0780) (0.107)
Parents’ log income -0.0289 0.0456 -0.0744*
(0.0306) (0.0327) (0.0448)
classpctile 0.231 0.161 0.0701
(0.557) (0.491) (0.743)
classpct 2 -0.558 0.130 -0.688
(1.230) (1.171) (1.699)
classpct 3 0.505 -0.0688 0.573
(0.784) (0.789) (1.113)
# of HS math courses 0.0263* 0.0148 0.0115
(0.0145) (0.0130) (0.0195)
# of HS for. language courses 0.0334** 0.0400** -0.00663
(0.0149) (0.0161) (0.0220)
# of HS science courses 0.0115 -0.00329 0.0148
(0.0132) (0.0126) (0.0183)
AFQT 0.144*** 0.128*** 0.0161
(0.0249) (0.0225) (0.0335)
mom HS 0.158*** 0.0822* 0.0760
(0.0387) (0.0425) (0.0575)
mom BA 0.0595 0.0369 0.0226
(0.0524) (0.0538) (0.0751)
dad HS 0.0535 0.0500 0.00353
(0.0359) (0.0400) (0.0538)
dad BA 0.0844* 0.0944** -0.0100
(0.0453) (0.0433) (0.0627)
Mother’s Age FB 0.00482 0.0119** -0.00703
(0.00429) (0.00470) (0.00637)
Mother’s Age YB 0.00259 -0.00584* 0.00843*
(0.00297) (0.00331) (0.00446)
singmom 0.0184 -0.000916 0.0194
(0.0530) (0.0541) (0.0758)
female 0.649
(0.503)
Constant 0.158 -0.490 -0.490
(0.348) (0.362) (0.366)
Observations 926 808 1,734
Adjusted R2 0.239 0.251 0.250
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Region and year dummy coefficients not shown.
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Table C-3: BA Gender Gap in Cohort 1 NLSY79
NLSY79 BAGRAD
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES F M βF − βM
black 0.00821 0.0661 -0.0579
(0.0454) (0.0505) (0.0678)
hispanic 0.00950 -0.0695 0.0790
(0.0591) (0.0657) (0.0883)
Parents’ log income -0.00459 0.0524* -0.0569
(0.0250) (0.0276) (0.0372)
classpctile 0.511 -0.168 0.679
(0.455) (0.414) (0.615)
classpct 2 -1.582 0.0281 -1.610
(1.004) (0.988) (1.408)
classpct 3 1.499** 0.593 0.907
(0.640) (0.665) (0.923)
# of HS math courses 0.0365*** 0.0186* 0.0179
(0.0118) (0.0110) (0.0162)
# of HS for. language courses 0.0331*** 0.0719*** -0.0388**
(0.0122) (0.0136) (0.0182)
# of HS science courses 0.00913 0.00758 0.00155
(0.0108) (0.0106) (0.0151)
AFQT 0.0831*** 0.0819*** 0.00119
(0.0203) (0.0189) (0.0278)
mom HS 0.0780** 0.0862** -0.00820
(0.0316) (0.0358) (0.0477)
mom BA 0.120*** 0.00895 0.111*
(0.0427) (0.0454) (0.0623)
dad HS 0.0225 0.00576 0.0167
(0.0293) (0.0337) (0.0446)
dad BA 0.0844** 0.0917** -0.00727
(0.0370) (0.0365) (0.0520)
Mother’s Age FB 0.00927*** 0.00668* 0.00259
(0.00350) (0.00396) (0.00528)
Mother’s Age YB 0.00232 -0.00120 0.00352
(0.00243) (0.00279) (0.00369)
singmom 0.00397 0.0219 -0.0179
(0.0433) (0.0456) (0.0628)
female 0.440
(0.416)
Constant -0.373 -0.814*** -0.814***
(0.284) (0.305) (0.303)
Observations 926 808 1,734
Adjusted R2 0.346 0.365 0.355
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Region and year dummy coefficients not shown.
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Table C-4: High School Gender Gap in Cohort 2 NLSY97
NLSY97 HSGRAD
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES F M βF − βM
black 0.0206 -0.00164 0.0223
(0.0225) (0.0282) (0.0358)
hispanic -0.0244 -0.0582* 0.0338
(0.0270) (0.0298) (0.0402)
Parents’ log income 0.0197** 0.0231** -0.00345
(0.00914) (0.0113) (0.0144)
classpctile 0.263 0.790*** -0.527
(0.237) (0.254) (0.348)
classpct 2 -0.174 -1.307** 1.133*
(0.532) (0.602) (0.801)
classpct 3 -0.107 0.593 -0.699
(0.342) (0.400) (0.524)
# of HS math courses 0.00893** 0.0135*** -0.00453
(0.00409) (0.00481) (0.00628)
# of HS for. language courses 0.00939** 0.00584 0.00355
(0.00370) (0.00411) (0.00553)
# of HS science courses -0.00103 -0.00699 0.00597
(0.00408) (0.00475) (0.00623)
AFQT 0.0470*** 0.0487*** -0.00165
(0.0101) (0.0108) (0.0148)
mom HS 0.0592*** 0.108*** -0.0492
(0.0227) (0.0273) (0.0353)
mom BA 0.0202 -0.0275 0.0477*
(0.0172) (0.0195) (0.0259)
dad HS 0.0770*** 0.0390* 0.0380
(0.0189) (0.0229) (0.0295)
dad BA -0.0129 -0.0103 -0.00258
(0.0172) (0.0205) (0.0266)
Mother’s Age FB -0.000916 -0.00106 0.000147
(0.00225) (0.00253) (0.00338)
Mother’s Age YB 0.000592 0.00356* -0.00297
(0.00197) (0.00218) (0.00293)
singmom 0.00485 -0.0551*** 0.0599**
(0.0150) (0.0182) (0.0234)
female 0.124
(0.171)
Constant 0.448*** 0.324** 0.324**
(0.109) (0.133) (0.126)
Observations 1,173 1,072 2,245
Adjusted R2 0.135 0.160 0.149
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Region and year dummy coefficients not shown.
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Table C-5: College Entrance Gender Gap in Cohort 2 NLSY97
NLSY97 ENTER
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES F M βF − βM
black 0.131*** 0.0619 0.0692
(0.0381) (0.0476) (0.0605)
hispanic -0.0994** -0.0367 -0.0628
(0.0457) (0.0503) (0.0678)
Parents’ log income 0.0603*** 0.0400** 0.0203
(0.0155) (0.0190) (0.0243)
classpctile -0.132 0.987** -1.119*
(0.402) (0.428) (0.588)
classpct 2 1.496* -0.645 2.141
(0.902) (1.015) (1.353)
classpct 3 -1.193** 0.0652 -1.258
(0.580) (0.674) (0.885)
# of HS math courses 0.00510 0.00234 0.00276
(0.00692) (0.00810) (0.0106)
# of HS for. language courses 0.0274*** 0.0245*** 0.00294
(0.00628) (0.00693) (0.00933)
# of HS science courses 0.0113 0.00240 0.00886
(0.00692) (0.00800) (0.0105)
AFQT 0.0988*** 0.0707*** 0.0281
(0.0171) (0.0182) (0.0250)
mom HS 0.0830** 0.0835* -0.000499
(0.0384) (0.0460) (0.0596)
mom BA -0.0273 0.0808** -0.108**
(0.0291) (0.0329) (0.0438)
dad HS 0.0982*** 0.0171 0.0811
(0.0320) (0.0386) (0.0498)
dad BA 0.0140 0.0991*** -0.0852*
(0.0291) (0.0346) (0.0449)
Mother’s Age FB 0.00261 0.00694 -0.00433
(0.00381) (0.00427) (0.00571)
Mother’s Age YB 0.00118 0.000646 0.000529
(0.00334) (0.00367) (0.00495)
singmom -0.0190 -0.0201 0.00118
(0.0254) (0.0306) (0.0395)
female 0.0636
(0.289)
Constant -0.516*** -0.580** -0.580***
(0.184) (0.225) (0.213)
Observations 1,173 1,072 2,245
Adjusted R2 0.303 0.299 0.312
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Region and year dummy coefficients not shown.
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Table C-6: BA Gender Gap in Cohort 2 NLSY97
NLSY97 BAGRAD
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES F M βF − βM
black 0.0574 0.0320 0.0254
(0.0405) (0.0415) (0.0584)
hispanic -0.0911* -0.0944** 0.00331
(0.0486) (0.0438) (0.0655)
Parents’ log income 0.0461*** 0.0329** 0.0131
(0.0234) (0.0165) (0.0173)
classpctile -0.668 0.0794 -0.747
(0.427) (0.373) (0.567)
classpct 2 2.277** 0.313 1.964
(0.957) (0.884) (1.306)
classpct 3 -1.243** 0.247 -1.490*
(0.615) (0.587) (0.854)
# of HS math courses -0.00247 0.00964 -0.0121
(0.00735) (0.00706) (0.0102)
# of HS for. language courses 0.0285*** 0.0167*** 0.0117
(0.00666) (0.00604) (0.00901)
# of HS science courses 0.00731 0.00445 0.00286
(0.00735) (0.00697) (0.0102)
AFQT 0.0629*** 0.0448*** 0.0181
(0.0182) (0.0158) (0.0241)
mom HS -0.0490 0.0812** -0.130**
(0.0408) (0.0401) (0.0575)
mom BA 0.151*** 0.113*** 0.0379
(0.0309) (0.0287) (0.0422)
dad HS 0.0875** -0.0164 0.104*
(0.0339) (0.0336) (0.0480)
dad BA 0.0524* 0.0890*** -0.0366
(0.0309) (0.0302) (0.0434)
Mother’s Age FB -0.000714 0.00392 -0.00463
(0.00405) (0.00372) (0.00551)
Mother’s Age YB 0.00721** -0.00126 0.00846*
(0.00355) (0.00320) (0.00478)
singmom -0.0427 -0.0551** 0.0123
(0.0270) (0.0267) (0.0381)
female -0.0433
(0.279)
Constant -0.615*** -0.572*** -0.572***
(0.196) (0.196) (0.205)
Observations 1,173 1,072 2,245
Adjusted R2 0.362 0.400 0.390
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Region and year dummy coefficients not shown.
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